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 Volume I of the thesis is the research component. The first paper is a 
systematic review of the literature. Existing literature has been critically examined to 
determine if there is a link between criminality and terrorism and the function of the 
link.  The second paper is an empirical research paper drawing on secondary data. 
Due to limitations in the reliability of the data the original choice of methodology was 
adapted and a Q-Sort was completed. This explores the opinions of 22 Prevent 
professionals on 39 statements relating to Extreme-Right Wing, Islamist and No 
Specific ideologies. The third paper is a public dissemination document, which offers 
an accessible summary of the systematic review and research paper.  
Volume II 
Volume II consists of five Clinical Practice Reports (CPR). The CPR’s relate 
to work completed during training placements. CPR 1 presents both a cognitive and 
psychodynamic formulation of a 37-year-old female experiencing difficulty with 
anger. CPR 2 presents a service evaluation exploring the perspectives of both 
service users and staff of a therapeutic structured day. CPR 3 presents a case study 
of a 15-year old girl, referred to Dialectical Behavioural Therapy (DBT) to address 
her self-harming behaviour. CPR 4 documents a single-case experimental design 
implemented to evaluate the effectiveness of a behavioural intervention for a 45-
year-old male with Autism Spectrum Disorder. Finally, CPR 5 consists of the abstract 
from a case study presentation regarding a 30-year-old male who was referred for 
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Is there a functional link between criminality and terrorism?: A Systematic 
Review  
ABSTRACT 
Background: Understanding the vulnerabilities to extremism is a growing area of 
research within the literature. The role of personality traits and mental illness has 
been examined, resulting in varying conclusions. One vulnerability factor that has 
received less attention within the literature is the role of criminality.  
Aims: The review provides a comprehensive account of research that has explored 
the factor of criminality. It aims to identify if there is an association between 
criminality and terrorism and provide an explanation of its function. 
Method: An inclusion criteria was defined and a comprehensive search of electronic 
databases conducted using PsychINFO, PROQUEST, Web of Science and Wiley. 
Results: Twelve studies met the inclusion criteria and were included. Eleven studies 
utilised a methodology of open source data. One study conducted a survey with 
Police Officers. Quality assessment indicated that the studies were low risk of bias 
but were of low quality evidence.  
Key findings: The evidence suggests that there is an association between 
criminality and terrorism. The functional link of the association remains unclear from 
this review, although tentative hypotheses are proposed.  





Vulnerabilities to extremism  
 
Terrorism is an ever growing challenge in today’s society. Understanding the 
psychological mechanisms involved in acts of terrorism has long been a goal of 
professionals (Borum, 2014). However, it is not as simple as distinguishing between 
those who commit a terrorist offence and those who do not.  Terrorist offending is 
suggested to be the product of a balance between ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors (Horgan, 
2008). In the absence of protective factors, vulnerabilities can act as ‘push’ factors 
and ideology can act as a ‘pull’ factor (Horgan, 2008). It is argued that factors 
beyond adversity lead an individual to engage in terrorism (Miller, 2006) but exactly 
what these factors are remains unclear.  
 
Psychological characteristics of terrorists 
 
Literature exploring psychological characteristics of terrorists has examined 
the role of personality and mental illness as associated factors.  
Personality Traits 
 
Early studies of terrorists concluded that the act of engagement was linked to 
abnormal personalities, often labelling terrorists as psychopathic (Gill & Corner, 
2017). Cooper (1978) claimed that sociopathic or psychopathic traits were the 
rationale behind terrorists engaging in violent extremism. However, he suggested 
that if an opportunity for violent extremism was not there then these individuals 
would express their violent impulses in alternative ways, suggesting that the drive is 
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linked to violence rather than the cause (Cooper, 1978). According to both Lasch 
(1979) and Pearlstein (1991) narcissism is central to understanding the terrorist 
personality, with Pearlstein (1991) suggesting that terrorists express their 
“narcissistic rage” in their acts of terrorism.  
The role of narcissism reoccurs within psychoanalytic explanations for 
terrorist violence (Meloy & Yakeley, 2014; Gill & Corner, 2017) and points to 
unconscious motives from dysfunctional childhoods (Borum, 2004). Thackrah (2004) 
suggested that it is difficulties with their own identity that increases the risk of acts of 
violence in terrorists. It has also been suggested that lack of empowerment, low self-
esteem, and lack of independence or assertiveness creates a susceptibility to 
terrorism (Orbach, 2001; Lawal, 2002). Meloy and Yakeley, (2014) see terrorism as 
a communication enacted through violence, with conscious and unconscious 
meaning; “The lens through which we view the violent true believer as lone wolf is 
contemporary psychoanalytic theory, with an emphasis on attachment, object 
relations, mental structure (particularly superego identifications and defenses), and 
developmental course” (p348). 
However, political scientists continue to argue against this view, stating that 
there are no abnormalities in terrorist’s personalities (Crenshaw, 2002; Reid, 2002; 
Sageman, 2004).  Instead, they engage in terrorist acts because it provides them 
with an escape from routine life (Orbach, 2001) and a sense of status and glory 
(Mazarr, 2004).  Silke (2003) argued that empirical research does not identify distinct 
personalities of terrorists, whilst others have concluded that there is no single 
personality type or any clear evidence of serious psychopathology (Post, 2005; 
Martin, 2011). From the evidence available Gill and Corner (2017) concluded that it 
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is too simple to propose that engagement in terrorism is caused by personality 
factors alone, thus highlighting the need to consider additional contributory factors.  
Mental Health  
 
Many have explored the link between mental health and terrorism. Initially it 
was believed that mental illness was criminogenic for terrorism (Cooper, 1978; 
Pearce, 1977) but this could not be readily identified, so the idea of a causal link was 
abandoned (Abrahms, 2011; Post 2005, 2007; Sher & Rice, 2015). It has been 
suggested that although acts of terrorism may appear irrational and the product of 
delusional thinking, the individuals involved are mentally robust and able to act in a 
rational manner (Loza, 2007). Those taking this position argue that carrying out such 
acts of terrorism requires detailed planning and precision, which is not characteristic 
of individuals with some mental illnesses (Stern, 1999; Reid, 2002; Sageman, 2004). 
Gill & Corner (2017) suggest that conclusions that mental health was not a 
contributing factor were drawn from errors within the research. The errors related to 
the way in which mental disorder was characterised, dismissing the presence of 
mental disorder and the characterisation of the terrorist used (Gill & Corner, 2017). 
Problems with research in this area concern the precise definitions of mental 
disorder, mental health and mental illness. The literature tends to take a 
dichotomous and static view when it explores mental disorder, rather than 
considering the broad range of disorders that can be present (Corner, Mason & Gill, 
2015).  Furthermore, not all mental health disorders imply that an individual lacks the 
capability for planning an attack. In addition, much of the research within this field 
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relies on open source data where the information on mental health difficulties is often 
missing. 
An association has more recently been established with mental disorder in 
lone actor terrorism (Hewitt, 2003; Gill & Corner, 2017; Corner, Gill & Mason, 2015).  
Corner et al., (2015) concluded that over 40% of their 153 lone actor sample had a 
diagnosed mental health disorder, which is greater than that found in the general 
population. However, although there is an over-representation of mental health 
problems in lone actor terrorists, it remains the case that the majority of the cases 
have no mental health diagnosis. Corner & Gill (2015) report lone actors are 13.5 
times more likely to have mental health disorders than group actors. However, their 
study also found that group actors have lower reported prevalence rates than the 
general population (Corner & Gill, 2015), suggesting that the explanation for this 
difference may lie in the lack of assessment of group actors, rather than any 
superiority in their mental health. Clinical assessment of terrorist offenders is not 
routinely carried out unless requested by the court. It cannot therefore be concluded 
that this is the explanation for all lone actor terrorism (Gill & Corner, 2017). Rather, it 
has been suggested that it is beneficial to identify cognitive and behavioural features 
that are functionally linked to engagement, than to confine the role of mental health 
to diagnosis (Hoffmann, Meloy, Guidmann & Ermer, 2011).  
 
Terrorism and Criminality 
 
A further potential vulnerability for terrorism related behaviour is the role of 
criminality. This has received less attention academically but has been widely 
commented on in the media because of its prominence in the backgrounds of recent 
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terrorist offences in Europe and the UK. This contradicts Bhui, Everitt and Jones 
(2014) assumption that ‘radicalisation’ is a term used to understand why ‘ordinary 
people with no history of criminality commit a terrorist act’. 
A paper by Lloyd & Kleinot (2017) outlines a typology of terrorists: those 
motivated largely by ‘noble cause’ or ideology; those with a criminal background 
motivated largely by their criminality and violence; and those motivated by extreme 
and pathological narcissism expressed in violence. There is some support in the 
literature for these typologies (Hacker, 1976; Schmid & de Graaf, 1982; Miller, 2006). 
Lloyd & Kleinot, (2017) report that 60% of convicted terrorists in UK custody in 2008 
had a criminal history and describe how criminality per se can function as a risk 
factor for extremism.  Carrapico, Irrera and Tuman (2015) also propose that those 
individuals who already hold criminal beliefs and attitudes take less radicalising to 
cross the threshold and commit a terrorist offence as they do not have to overcome 
their internal inhibitions of committing crime. This view is supported by Lloyd & 
Kleinot (2017).  
A range of serious journalism explores this concept of criminality further. 
Journalists have proposed an idea of a ‘new breed’ of Jihadist terrorist, who use their 
criminal skills in the service of terrorist objectives, blurring the line between Islamist 
extremism and crime (Faiola & Mekhennet, 2016). They use their criminal skills to 
raise money for terrorist offense and to travel to Syria, to lend their support to Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). A court in Cologne tried eight men suspected of 
committing robberies against businesses, schools and churches to fund Islamist 
fighting between August 2011 and November 2014 (Faiola & Mekhennet, 2016). 
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Violence is a key part of terrorist attacks and to maintaining allegiance to the cause 
and punishing ‘wrongdoers’.    
The perpetrators of the Brussels Airport attack were found to have previously 
been imprisoned for violent offences and the alleged leader of attacks on Paris had a 
number of convictions for violence (Aly, 2015). A 42-year-old Moroccan male who 
allegedly had connections recruiting for Islamic State is said to have targeted people 
with criminal records (Faiola & Mekhennet, 2016). Recent terrorist attacks in France 
have been reported to have been carried out by individuals who had been recruited 
in prison. This includes an individual who killed seven people in a Jewish school in 
Toulouse in 2012, and was a repeat violent offender. Additionally, one of the 
brothers behind the Charlie Hebdo massacre, was recruited by a top al-Qaeda 
operative while awaiting trial in prison, along with another, who in January 2015 
synchronized his terrorist attack to carry out the Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris, 
and later at the Porte de Vincennes siege. 
The Independent newspaper reported on ISIS recruiting violent criminals and 
gang members, highlighting an individual from Copenhagen, who killed two by 
gunfire in February 2015, pledging allegiance to ISIS (Dearden, 2016). He became 
part of a gang in his teen years and had an extensive criminal history, committing a 
range of petty crimes and taking drugs, prior to stabbing an individual in 2013 and 
going to prison, where it is reported that he was radicalised (Dearden, 2016).  
Reports based on the Profiles of Individual Radicalisation in United States 
(PIRUS) dataset have identified that extremist individuals with a criminal history are 
at an increased risk of radicalisation (Jenson, James, LaFree, Atwell-Seate, Pisoiu & 
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Stevenson, 2016). With the journalistic evidence presented it appears to be an 
important area to explore further. It also raises the question of what leads criminals 
to engage in extremist activity and what do they gain from such behaviour?  
 
Aims/rationale for the systematic review  
 
Drawing on these discussions, the aims of this systematic review are to 
appraise current research within this field and address the following research 
questions: 
1. Is there an association between criminality and terrorism? 













Search strategy  
 
Four databases were searched for this review. These databases were 
deemed to be the most relevant for this research question: PsychINFO, 
PROQUEST, Web of Science and Wiley. The last search was completed in August 
2017. Databases were searched using the keyword terms described in Table 1. 
Where possible, the search terms were mapped to subject headings and then 
expanded using the databases’ thesaurus. All of the searches were inclusive of free 
text of the abstract only. The truncation function “*” was also used to broaden search 
terms. The search terms in group 1 and group 2 were combined within their group 
using the Boolean operator “OR”. To combine the searches across the two groups 
the Boolean operator “AND” was used.  The reference sections of the identified 
articles were also inspected and any additional articles which met the inclusion 










Table 1: Search terms used for database searches  
 Search Group 1 Search Group 2 
Terrorism Criminal record 
Counterterrorism Criminal Conviction 
Lone wolf Extremism Criminal record*   
Lone attacker Precursor* 
Lone attackers   Criminal histor* 
Lone actor Criminal conviction* 
Lone actors     Criminal past* 
Terrori* History of crime* 
Radical* History of offend* 
Extremis*  





Following preliminary searches returning limited papers it was decided to use 
a broad inclusion criteria for this review (Table 2). Due to the limitations of 
methodological options for research within the field of terrorism the papers were not 






Table 2: Inclusion criteria used for search 
Inclusion criteria  
No restrictions were made for the demographics or gender 
Any form of terrorism/extremism 
No restrictions on the terrorism/extremism definition used 




Search results  
 
The literature searches identified a limited number of articles which met the 
inclusion criteria. These studies used case study or case file review methods and 
therefore should be considered as indicative and offering only tentative guidance. 
However, this review topic was still considered necessary and important for the 
following reasons;  
 As the introduction highlighted there is a pressing need to identify and 
understand the function of criminality and terrorism. 
 To understand the insights that have already been gained in this area. 
 To identify the direction for future research and highlight good methodological 
practice.  
The search identified ten papers which met the inclusion criteria.  A further 
two of the papers were identified within the reference sections. These two studies 
were not peer-reviewed papers (explaining why they were not identified by the 
12 
 
electronic search) however, they were well-cited papers within this field and 
therefore it was decided to include them within the review.  


























Figure 1: PRISMA diagram of the studies selection   
Records identified through 
database searching 


























 Additional records identified 
through other sources 
(n =  30 ) 





(n = 25) 
Full-text articles assessed 
for eligibility 
(n =  77) 
Full-text articles excluded, 
with reasons 
(n =65) 
Excluded due to: 
 Not being relevant 
 Not being 
empirical papers 
 Not in English Studies included in 
systematic review 
(n = 12) 
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Quality appraisal  
 
Eleven of the twelve papers included were reviews of case files from a range 
of sources, such as court documents, newspaper articles or interviews with people. 
There was no assessment tool identified to access the quality of case file reviews. 
Therefore, one was developed using The Methodological Quality Checklist (Downs 
and Black, 1998) and research looking at case studies (Cepeda & Matin, 2005). One 
paper used a survey methodology to review the opinions of American Police 
Officers. The area of quality covered in the case file quality assessment tool was 
considered robust enough to accommodate this survey paper.  
The studies were assessed in relation to a range of biases, including 
reporting, selection, detection, performance, statistical and internal validity. The 
generalizability of the research was also rated.  To rate the quality of each study a 
scoring system was devised based on The Methodological Quality Checklist (Downs 
& Black, 1998), with low risk, high risk and unclear risk. Each item receives a score 
of 0 (no evidence or unable to determine evidence for that item) or 1 (clear 
evidence). The scoring criteria for the Case Review Quality Checklist can be found in 
Appendix A. 
Table 4 highlights the Quality Checklist rating for each of the studies. The 
ratings are depicted using a colour-coded scoring system (Appendix B). The rating 
bias cut off out of a total of 20 was as follows: 
 Low risk of bias – score between 14 to 20 
 Moderate risk of bias – score between 7 to 13 
 High risk of bias – score between 0 to 6 
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Level of evidence 
 
The quality of the evidence is determined on the design of the study, which 
refers to the level of confidence of the findings and recommendations (Deeks et al, 
2003). This review relied on guidance by the National Institute of Clinical Excellence 
(NICE, 2005) to identify the level of evidence for these studies. The rating scale can 
be found in Appendix C. All but one of the papers within the search were reviews of 
case files from a range of sources, such as court documents, newspaper articles or 
interviews. The rating scale identified these studies as 4(-) in their level of rating, 
lowest of the hierarchy. Therefore, the appraisal of methodological quality should 
acknowledge the nascent stage of this literature. In the hierarchy of research 
evidence case reports, background information and expert opinion falls within the 
weakest evidence for research (Stegenga, 2014). Therefore, despite the individual 
level of quality of each paper, it needs to be held in mind that there are a number of 
more robust methodologies that could be implemented. However, due to the 
difficulties in accessing terrorist offenders’ researchers have had to utilise other 
methods to test hypotheses and explore this field further. Therefore, it was deemed 










Description of studies  
 
A summary of the 12 papers and the extracted information is presented in 
Table 3 in alphabetical order. The aims of the study are summarised, followed by the 












Table 3: Description of the studies  




To understand the 
Jihadist terrorist in 
Europe both on an 




31 cases of Jihadi terrorism 
that occurred in Europe 
between September 2001 
and September 2006.  
This totalled 200 individuals.  
 
Only included people 
formally charged. 
 
Used a range of open sources for data 
(350 in total): 
 Media reports (in English, 
French, German, Spanish and 
Dutch) 
 Official reports and statements 
from websites of ministries, 
courts and other government 
agencies.  
 Terrorism Knowledge Base 
dataset.  
Describe the 31 Jihadist terror attacks, 
the 28 terrorist networks that these were 
made up of and the individual 
characteristics of the 200 individuals 
from these networks. 
 
 
 Almost a quarter of the sample had a 
previous conviction. 
 Most of these were for possession of a 
firearm.  
 Many had been involved in criminal 
activities without being sentenced to 
prison.  
  
Comparison to Sageman’s sample: 
 Similar figures had a previous conviction. 
 
 
Bakker & de Bont, 
2016. (Netherlands) 
 
To explore key 
characteristics of 
Jihadist foreign 
fighters from Belgium 





Total sample was 370 cases 
(211 Belgium and 159 
Dutch) of Jihadist foreign 




Data sources used: 
 Media reports.  
 Government documents. 
 Court proceedings.  
Interviews with government officials, 
Syrian refuges, family and friends of 





 20% had previously been suspected of 








Study Details & Aim Sample Outcome Key findings related to criminality: 




To explore European 
Jihadists to 
understand their 
nature and dynamics. 
 
79 European Jihadists with 
criminal pasts.  
 
Data taken from the UK, 
Belgium, France, Germany, 
Netherlands and Denmark.  
 
It was collected between 
March-July 2016. 
 
Open source data used, which included: 
 Court reports 
 Media reports 
 Government reports  
Also completed interviews with current 
or former counter-terrorism officials.  
 
Coded 30 variables in total, covering 
three areas: 
 Biological information 
 Involvement in Jihadism 
 Criminal history 
 
 
 68% had been involved in petty crime. 
 Majority were ‘low level, local’ criminals. 
 65% had a history of violent crime. 
 57% had been in prison at least once. 
 18% had been radicalised during their 
prison sentence. 
 6% were involved in credit card fraud or 
identity theft. 
Chermak, Freilich & 
Simone, 2010. (USA).  
 
To better understand 
the American state 
police officer’s views 
of three specific 
terrorism threats and 
public safety issues. 
Used specific Police officers 
that track extremist offenders 
from 37 states in the US.  
 
Collected their sample from 
the National Safety 
Information Bureau’s 2006 
Directory of Law 
Enforcement Administrators.  
 
Three mailings followed by a 
phone call took place 
between November 2006 -
September 2007.  
 
Used a survey to collect data which was 
mailed to participants.  
 
The survey examined a range of areas: 
 How they define terrorism  
 Sources they use for 
information on domestic 
terrorism  
 What are the groups and how 
many exist? 
 How many members exist? 
 What groups are considered 
threats? 
 How many criminal incidents 
occur in a year? 
How many members are arrested? 
 Officers reported that far-right extremist 
are involved in a number of terrorist, 
preparatory and routine crimes.  
 17.9% of officers believed they commit 
between 1-5 preparatory crimes. 
 7.1% of officers believed they commit 
between 6-10 preparatory crimes. 
 3.6% of officers believed they commit 
between 21-30 preparatory crimes. 
 13.3% of officers believed they 
committed 1-5 non-ideological routine 
crimes.  
 6.7% of officers believed they committed 
6-10 non-ideological routine crimes. 
 30% of officers believed they committed 
31+ non-ideological routine crimes. 
 Two state agencies reported Islamist and 






















Total number of cases = 974 
 
Far-Right = 637 
Far-Left = 182 
AQAM = 155 
 
All data is collected from the Extremist 
Crime Database (ECDB). 
 
Suspect level characteristics are 
explored by three sets of data: 
 Set 1 – demographics. 
 Set 2 – criminogenic conditions.  
 Set 3 – type and timing of 
offence. 
 
County level data collected from: 
 US Census Year 200 
 Religion Data Achieve (ARDA) 
 Uniformed Crime Reports 
 
Bivariate analysis and multinomial 




 Far-Left and AQAM had similar criminal 
histories (26.9% vs 29%). 
 Their crimes were almost all ideologically 
driven. 
 53.4% of far-right had at least one prior 
arrest.  
 Far-right crimes were much less likely to 
be ideologically driven (36.6%) which 
was a significant difference. 
 Multinomial results used far-Right as the 
reference category. 
 Far-Leftists were significantly less like to 
have prior arrests p= <.05 
 AQAM were significantly less likely to 
have had prior arrests p=<.001 
Gill, Corner, Horgan 
& Silver, 2016. 
(USA).  
 
To compare a cohort 
of violent lone actors 
and mass murderers 







In total the sample included 
15 lone actors and 115 mass 
murderers.  
 
1990-2005 = 75 cases in 
total 
2006 – 2013 = 107 cases in 
total 
 
Gathered data from open sources, such 
as media reports and literature reviews.  
 
Developed a coding book based on the 
literature.  
 
Bivariate (Chi square) and logistic 
regression completed on the data. 
 
 In the first cohort 21.5% had a record of 
previous imprisonment.  
 In the second cohort this had raised to 
35.5%. 







Study Details & Aim Sample Outcome Key findings related to criminality: 
 
Gruenewald, 
Chermak & Freilich, 
2013. (USA) 
 
To examine whether 
homicides by loner 
far-right extremists are 
different to the 
comparison set of 
homicides by other 
far-right extremists.  
 
 
137 homicides were 
reviewed in total (47 loner & 
92 other). 
Data was collected from 
1990-2010. 
 
Data was collected from the United 
States Extremist Crime Database 
(ECDB).  
 
Measured 5 independent variables. 
Bivariate comparative analysis was 
conducted on the data. Binary logistics 
was then completed on significant 
results. 
 
 More than 50% of the sample had a prior 
adult arrest. 
 Loners were more likely to have one or 
more prior arrests (61% to 51.1%) but 
this was not a significant difference.  
 There was no statistical difference for 
prior violent arrests. 
Horgan, Shortland, 
Abbasciano & 
Walsh, 2016. (USA). 
 
To explore data of 
behaviours taken by 
global Jihadists to 
highlight prevalence 
and diversity of 
behaviours. 
 
183 individuals convicted for 
terrorist offences in the US 
between 1995 –2012.  
 
144 group terrorists 
39 lone actors  
 




Data collected from open sources 
including: 
 First-hand accounts 
 News reports 
 Court transcripts 
 Literature review 
 
Coding was inter-rater reliability was 
rated at 87.95% 
 
Use Chi-square and Fisher’s exact to 
explore significant differences between 
lone and group actors. 
 
Previous arrest data only known for 54.60% of 
the sample. Of those: 
 61% had a previous arrest 
 19% violent offences 
 15% potentially violent  
 15% crimes against a person  
 8% property related offences 
 13% drug related offences 
 
Previous imprisonment was known for 38% of the 
sample. Of those: 
 26.80% had previously been in prison 
 8.5% were multiple imprisonments  
 
Jacques & Taylor, 
2013. (UK) 
 
To test hypotheses 
relating to the 
involvement of 
females in terrorism.   
222 female terrorists and 
269 male terrorists.  
 
From a range of terrorist 
groups.  
 
Data was collected from archival 
biographical material.  
 
Measured 8 variables using a detailed 
coding form. 
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compared to terrorist 
offenders.  
 
Dutch National Statistic Data 
violent offender sample = 
3,499 and Jihadist 
Netherlands sample = 209.  
 
Open source data 27 
European terrorists. 
Data sources used: 
 Dutch National Statistics (CBS). 
 Open source data. 
 
 
 Half of the sample had been involved in 
violent crime. 
 A third had been radicalised in prison. 
Porter & Kebbell, 
2011. (Australia) 
 
To describe the 
Australian context of 
radicalisation. 
 
   
Sample of 21 convicted 
terrorists in Australia. 
Cases were identified from the 
Australian Attorney General’s website.  
Data sources used: 
 179 media reports 
 72 law reports  
 
Data coded as present or absent and 
quotes included where available. 
 
 6 had a previous criminal record. 
 1 had been to prison. 
 Offences included dishonesty (2), theft 
(2), driving convictions (2) and firearms 
(1). 
 8 reported previous addiction issues 




To explore to what 
extent Jihadists have 
a history of problem 
behaviour or mental 
disorder.  
 
Looked at radical Islamists 
from the Netherlands who 
police suspected of having 
joined the fight in Syria on 
were considered potential 
travellers.  
 
140 cases in group one (117 
men and 23 women) 
February – November 2014. 
 
Cases were identified from the 
Australian Attorney General’s website.  
Data sources used: 
 179 media reports 
 72 law reports  
 
Data coded as present or absent and 
quotes included where available. 
 47% of the sample had one or more 
report in the HKS (adult crime where 
police had attended).  
 Female travellers are five times more 
likely to be involved in crime. 
 Travellers in JD-Online was reported to 
be 53%. 
 Stopped drawing conclusions on specific 
crimes due to problems with recording in 







Across the papers there is a combined sample of 3,007 terrorists and 3,499 
violent offenders from case reports. The sample size of the studies varies from 21 to 
974 terrorists. Chermak et al., (2010) use a sample of Police Officers in America. 
They highlight that 37 States returned their surveys however, do not specify the 
number of officers included within this. It is not possible to tell if there are cross over 
terrorists included within each study, as data was gathered from open sources. 
Three of the studies drew from a sample of only male terrorists, six of the papers 
used data from both male and female terrorists and two of the papers did not state 
the gender of their sample. The number of female terrorists in the total sample is 
less than male terrorists.  
Five of the studies explored data from the United States (Chermak et al., 
2010; Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015; Gill et al., 2016; Gruenewald et al., 2013 & 
Horgan et al., 2016). One used Australian data and six studies explored data from 
within Europe. Three of the papers focused their sample on Jihadist terrorists, one 
focused on Islamist foreign fighters. Chermak & Gruenewald (2015) explored Right-
wing, Left-wing and al-Qaeda ‘inspired’ and associated movements, whilst Chermak 
et al., (2010) explored 15 different types of extremist groups. Greunewald et al., 
(2013) explored domestic Far-right extremists and three studies did not specify the 
ideology of their sample.  
Quality Appraisal of Studies 
 
For each paper’s appraisal see Table 4 for the risk of bias rating. Overall the 






Table 4: Quality appraisal risk of bias  


























































































Reporting Bias                         
Clear description of hypothesis / aims 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Main outcomes to be measured reported 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Characteristics of sample clearly reported 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0  
Findings clearly reported 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Selection Bias                         
Is the identification of relevant cases clearly described?  1 0 1 1 1 1 UC  1 1 0 1 1 
Were the cases representative of the target population? 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Is a comparison group used? 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Performance Bias                         
Were there procedures to identify and correct for response biases in the reported cases 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0  0 
Is there cross validation and triangulation of data sources? 1 1 1 1 0 1 UC 1 1 1 1  1 
Detection Bias                         
Was the method of outcome identification explained? 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Were outcomes hypotheses driven? 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Internal Validity  Bias                         
No unplanned statistical analysis 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Appropriateness of statistical analysis N/A 
N/
A N/A 1 1 N/A 1 1 1 
N/
A N/A  N/A 
Outcome measures accurate (reliable and valid) 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0  0 
Statistical Bias                         
The analytical method was appropriate for the research question 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
The qualitative descriptions of findings are rich and meaningful 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Were the conclusions logically and proportionately derived from the analytical method? 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Power                         
Sufficient power to detect clinically significant effect 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0  0 
Generalizability                          
Do the findings include enough “thick descriptions” for readers to assess the potential 
transferability appropriateness for their own settings? 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Are the findings congruent with, connected to, or confirmatory of prior theory? 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 






All of the studies were rated at low level of reporting bias. Each study 
provides detailed literature around their research topic, identifying the gaps that their 
study aims to fill. The outcomes that are going to be measured are highlighted and 
findings are clearly reported in each of the studies. Due to the postal survey 
methodology employed by Chermak et al., (2010) they were unable to provide 





 Eight of the twelve studies reviewed use a comparison group to compare their 
findings to, (Bakker et al., 2004; Chermak et al., 2010; Grenuewald et al., 2013; 
Jacques & Taylor, 2013; Chermak & Greunewald, 2015; Gill et al., 2016; Horgan et 
al., 2016 & Ljujic et al., 2017). The remaining four studies opted not to (Bakker & de 
Bont, 2016; Porter & Kebbell, 2011; Basra et al., 2016 & Weenink, 2015). Whereas 
Ljujic et al., (2017) compared the data of a Jihadist Netherlands sample to a violent 
offender sample, whilst Jacques & Taylor (2013) used male terrorists as a 
comparison group to explore the characteristics of female terrorists. Chermak & 
Greunewald, (2015) compared the characteristics of Far-right, Far-left extremists 
and al-Qaeda inspired movements and Bakker et al., (2006) compared the results of 
their study to Sageman’s (2004) results. Four of the studies used lone actors as a 
comparison group; Grenuewald et al., (2013) used a sample of Far-right extremists, 
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comparing the group terrorists to those who acted alone, whilst Gill et al., (2016) 
compared lone terrorists to mass murders. Horgan et al., (2016) compared group 
terrorists to lone actors and Chermack et al., (2010) compared police officer’s views 
of 15 different types of terrorists, exploring whether they acted alone, in a group or 
both. All but two of the studies within the review used a sample that was 
representative for the target population. Basra et al., (2016) only included European 
Jihadists with a criminal background within their study. The conclusions drawn from 
this research are skewed in favour of criminality; this allowed for additional 
exploration of the function of behaviour, for example engaging in criminal behaviour 
to gain money, and additional conclusions to be made. Chermak et al., (2010) used 
a sample of police officers with experience in the field of terrorism. The conclusions 
drawn from this paper may not be applicable to wider populations of non-
experienced officers.  
Due to difficulties of completing research within this field all but one of the 
studies identified their cases through the use of open source data. The problems 
with this level of evidence have previously been highlighted within this review, that is, 
it is at the lowest end of the evidence hierarchy (NICE, 2005). The studies varied in 
the level of information they provided regarding their data sources, for example 
Porter & Kebbell (2011) reported that they used 179 media reports and 72 law 
reports whereas Ljujic et al., (2017) state that open source data was used but do not 
specify numbers.  The possibility of replicating studies using this methodology is 






 Greunewald et al., (2013) do not employ any cross validation or triangulation 
of their data as they collect it all from one source, the United States Extremist Crime 
Database (ECDB). This may lead to biases in the data, as the possibility of 
balancing out bias is lost. Basra et al., (2016) explicitly recognise the possible bias 
using data from media reports, highlighting that they select the cases to report that 
are media worthy, without a charge being brought against the individual, thus 
skewing the data. To overcome this difficulty and prevent data distortion Basra et al., 
(2016) omitted cases where information was considered to be limited. Jacques & 
Taylor (2013) counterbalanced possible reporting bias of data through utilising both 
western and non-western data sources. Chermak et al., (2010) collected data from a 
range of American States to reduce bias. Chermak & Gruenewald, (2015) collected 
data on individuals from one data source (ECDB), however use a variety of sources 
for country level data (US Consensus Year 2000 and Religion Data Archive). The 
remaining seven papers all used a number of different open sources to collect their 
data, cross validate and triangulate data sources, including court, media and 
government reports, literature reviews and interviews with officials.  
 
Internal Validity Bias 
 
Seven of the studies reviewed make no mention of whether they checked for 
inter-rater reliability within their coding of the data (Bakker & de Bont, 2016; Ljujic et 
al., 2017; Porter & Kebbell, 2011; Gruenewald et al., 2013; Chermak & Gruenewald, 
2015; Basra, 2016; Chermak et al., 2010). It is unclear from the reporting of Weenink 
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(2015) whether the coding was checked for reliability. The study identifies that 
experts within the field, including social scientists, researchers at the National Police 
Agency and a forensic psychiatrist, were approached to provide an opinion on the 
study.  However, it does not state whether this related to coding the data. The 
remaining studies report attempting to manage inter-rater reliability of the data 
coding through a range of methods. Basra et al., (2016), had a senior researcher 
check through coding and an adjudicator make the final decision if discrepancies 
occurred.  Gill et al., (2016) implemented a system involving three coders coding the 
data. Jacques and Taylor (2013) conducted validity assessment of their coding 
through cross checking data coding and reported a rate of 100% reliability. Horgan 
et al., (2016) also completed analysis on their coding and highlighted an inter-rater 
reliability rate of 87.95% (SD=7.34%). The reliability of coding needs to be 




The method of outcome identification is clearly explained in seven of the 
studies. Jacques & Taylor (2013) and Gruenewald et al., (2013) both provided a 
coding sheet with descriptions of the variables being explored. Basra et al., (2016) 
describe in detail each area that is coded and how this was achieved. Bakker (2006) 
stated that they utilised the same methodology as Sageman (2004), however, did 





Statistical Bias  
 
Of the twelve studies reviewed ten used an analytical method that was 
appropriate for their research question. For five of the studies the analytical data was 
descriptive statistics, providing percentages of data to answer hypotheses and 
research questions. Although Ljujic et al., (2017) and Chermak et al., (2010) used a 
comparison group for their studies, they did not complete any statistical analysis to 
compare whether the differences in the samples were significant. Completing such 
statistical analysis would have strengthened the conclusions drawn.  Chermak & 
Gruenewald (2015) completed Chi-square, ANOVA analysis, bivariate statistics, 
multi-nomial and logistic regression on their data, which provided richer outputs and 
allowed them to compare groups of extremists, and the level of analysis was 
appropriate for their research question. Gill et al., (2016) completed bivariate and 
multivariate analysis on their data, which enabled them to be able to compare lone 
actors and mass murders, identifying significant differences between the two groups. 
Greunewald et al., (2013) completed a range of both bivariate and multivariate 
analysis that allowed them to compare loners and group terrorists. Horgan et al., 
(2016) used statistical analysis to compare lone actors versus group terrorists, 
however they only provided descriptive statistics for demographics, behavioural 
characteristics and engagement behaviours for group terrorists. 
Given that most of the studies in this review used a case note review 
methodology the overall quality of evidence must be considered as “only suggestive” 




Is there an association between criminality and terrorism? 
 
. Basra et al., (2016) used a sample of European Jihadist terrorists with 
criminal backgrounds so identifying criminal history association was inevitable. 
Although this may reduce the generalizability of their findings to European Jihadist 
samples, it allowed for additional conclusions to be made regarding the function of 
the behaviour, which will be summarised in the next section of this review. They 
found that the intensity of criminality varied from ‘one-time’ criminals, to repeat 
offenders and more sustained ‘career criminals’ (Basra et al., 2016). Within their 
sample the vast majority were low level, local criminals with only very few operating 
on a national or trans-national level (Basra et al., 2016), highlighting that 68% had 
been involved in some form of petty crime prior to the terrorist act (Basra et al., 
2016).  
The remaining papers did not limit their sample like Basra et al., (2016) to 
only terrorists with a criminal history but still found previous criminality present in 
some cases.  Horgan et al., (2016) reported on prior arrest information, which was 
known for 54.6% of the overall sample. Of that sample, 61% had been arrested prior 
to their engagement in a terrorist act. They highlighted that 19% of these arrests had 
been for violent offences and 15% for potentially violent offences (Horgan et al., 
2016). Furthermore, 18% were for crimes against persons, 8% for property related 
offences and 13% had been related to drug offences. In relation to prior 
imprisonment, data was available for 38% of the sample and it was reported that 
10.4% had previously been arrested and 8.5% of those had been arrested more than 
once (Horgan et al., 2016). 
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Bakker (2006) reported that almost a quarter of his sample (58 cases) had 
previously been arrested. In six cases this was hypothesised to be linked to their 
terrorism activity because the arrest was for illegal possession of a firearm. Porter & 
Kebbell (2011) reported that six of the 21 men in their sample had a previous 
criminal record for a range of offences including offences for dishonesty (2), theft (2), 
violence (2), firearms (1) and driving offences (2). One of the six men had been in 
prison and a further eight men in the sample reported past addiction issues (alcohol, 
drugs and gambling). 
Weenink (2015) reported that 47% of their sample was found to have one or 
more criminal records. Twenty-six percent of the women in the sample were found to 
have a criminal record, compared to 5% of women in the Netherlands as a whole, 
concluding that women who travelled to Syria tended to be more likely to have a 
criminal history than women in the wider population.  
Gruenewald et al., (2013) compared lone actors to other Far-right extremists. 
Lone actors are those who engage in terrorism related behaviours independently of 
others, i.e. not within a group or more than two people. It was hypothesised that 
loners would have higher rates of substance abuse problems, be more likely to have 
criminal convictions and to have more convictions for more serious violent offences. 
However, these hypotheses were not supported, as there was no significant 
difference between the two groups. In relation to criminal records, 61.7% of lone 
actors and 51.1% of other Far-right extremists had criminal records.  When exploring 
prior violent arrests, 22.8% of lone actors and 34% of other Far-right extremists were 
found to have a history of violent offences and 34% of lone actors and 29.3% of 
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other Far-right extremists were reported to have a history of alcohol or substance 
use (Gruenewald et al., 2013).  
Gill et al., (2016) explored the change in lone actor profiles over time and 
found that the number of previous imprisonment rose from 21.5% of cases between 
1990-2005 to 35.5% of cases between 2006-2013. This was reported to be 
significant to p<.01. The duration of these prison sentences was unknown. In total, 
approximately 20% of the variables that were tested within the study demonstrated 
variance across the two time periods (Gill et al., 2016); thus suggesting a change in 
the ‘terrorist’. This is apparent through the change in types of attacks, which have 
moved from planned group terrorist attacks, such as September 2011, to the lone 
actor based attacks, such as the Westminster Bridge attack. Ljujic et al., (2017) 
concluded that half of their Jihadist terrorist sample had previous offences for violent 
crime and a third of them had been radicalised whilst in prison. Chermak et al., 
(2015) found previous criminality present in Far-right (53.4%), Far-left (26.9%) and 
al-Qaeda inspired movements (AQAM:29%).  
Bakker & de Bont (2016) concluded that 20% of the sample of Jihadist foreign 
fighters from Belgium and the Netherlands had been suspected of criminal activity 
prior to traveling to Syria. However, Jacques & Taylor (2013) reported the lowest 
level of criminal history, with only five of their 491 cases having evidence of previous 
criminal history. The explanation for this difference in prevalence is unclear, but it 
could be hypothesised that higher numbers than Jacques & Taylor (2013) found, are 
as a result of the increase in terrorist attacks that have taken place since 2014 and 




Change over time 
 
Gill et al., (2016) compared lone actors and mass murderers over two 
different time periods and concluded that the ‘sample’ had an increase in recorded 
previous imprisonment, from 21.5% to 35.5%, which was significant. However, it is 
unclear whether these results relate to the lone actors, or the lone actors and mass 
murderers combined, making it difficult to draw robust conclusions. Although, it can 
be seen from this review that figures of previous criminal history in terrorists have 
risen. Basra et al’s., (2006) study reported criminal history was a factor in 25% of 
their sample, with studies in more recent years ranging between 50-60% (Ljujic et 
al., 2017; Horgan et al., 2016) suggesting an increase over time.    
 
Differences in samples  
 
The study samples varied from lone actors to group terrorists, enabling a 
comparison to be made about the difference in the prevalence of criminality between 
the two. Gruenewald et al., (2013) concluded that although lone actors were more 
likely to have at least one or more previous arrests than group terrorists, the 
difference was not significant. The studies also varied with the ideology of terrorists 
in their samples. Studies that explored Jihadist terrorist samples report pre-
criminality varying between 20 - 50+%. This excludes the findings of Basra et al., 
(2016), as their data is drawn from a population of terrorists with known criminal 
histories - thus skewing the data. Studies that explored Far-right terrorists found pre-
criminality between 50 - 54% of their samples (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015; 
Gruenewald et al., 2013). It has been found that Far-right terrorists are significantly 
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more likely to have prior convictions than Far-left and AQAM (Chermak & 
Gruenewald, 2015).  
 
Open source data 
 
A number of the reviewed studies identify difficulties with using open source 
data and the impact that this has on the strength of the conclusions that could be 
drawn.  Weenink (2015) reported that additional analysis of specific criminal 
activities was prevented due to limitations and gaps in the data. Although Basra et 
al., (2016) used a sample of European Jihadist terrorists with criminal backgrounds, 
they highlight that information regarding a terrorist’s criminal background is often 
difficult to obtain, can be classified and in some cases unknown. It could therefore be 
inferred that the association between criminality and terrorism may be stronger than 
the conclusions that have been drawn from such studies because of the need to omit 
some terrorists within the sample, because of difficulties with the criminality data. 
While studies continue to rely on open source data, and because of the difficulties in 
obtaining first-hand accounts from convicted terrorists, the evidence continues to be 
limited due to its second hand nature and does not allow for biases to be controlled.  
 
What is the functional link between criminality and terrorism? 
 
Despite studies finding evidence to support the existence of criminality in a 
number of terrorists, it cannot be concluded that criminality causes terrorism or 
extremist behaviour. This raises the question then of what the functional link 
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between criminality and terrorism may be.  From the review of these studies it 
appears that this is not something that has been widely explored within the literature. 
Basra et al., (2016) is the only study that explicitly tries to understand the functional 
link between criminality and terrorism, providing hypotheses for what this may be.   
One of these hypotheses was to suggest the idea of a ‘redemption narrative’ 
(Basra et al., 2016). Within this they argue that the criminals have experienced a 
trauma or life event that made them rationalise their turn to religion and supporting 
Jihadist groups to make up for the ‘sins’ of their criminal past (Basra et al., 2016). 
Support for this ‘redemptive’ function was also reported by Potter & Kebbell (2011), 
who identified six men within their sample who either renewed their interest in 
religion or converted to a faith due to their previous addiction habit.  
Another possible function of previous criminality is to raise funds to finance 
extremist behaviour. Basra et al., (2016) found that the fundraising methods used by 
individuals within their sample often mirrored that of their criminal pasts. Porter & 
Kebbell (2011) concluded that one of the males in their sample relied on fraud for a 
source of income to fund his terrorist behaviour. Horgan et al., (2016) reported that 
55.7% of their sample were funding their own terrorist activity or that of a wider 
groups and of those, 32.4% achieved their finances through creating fake charities 
or businesses or alternative illegal activities, such as drug dealing. Furthermore, 59 
individuals were either in possession of or involved in the production of false 
documents (Horgan et al., 2016).  
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A third hypothesis proposed by Basra et al., (2016) links to criminals having 
the required skills and access to weapons which makes them attractive to terrorist 
recruiters.  
The function of criminality may vary between ideologies. Chermak & 
Gruenewald (2015) identified that 36.6% of crimes committed by Far-right terrorists 
were less likely to be driven by ideology, which was a significant difference 
compared to Far-left and al-Qaeda. Chermak et al., (2010) concluded that police 
officers felt that 53% of Far-right extremists commit between 1-31+ non-ideological 
crimes. This suggests that the function for Far-right extremists may be linked to the 




















In total twelve studies relating to extremist violence and criminality were 
reviewed. Of these, ten papers were peer reviewed journal articles. The remaining 
two papers were well-cited studies within the literature and as such it was decided to 
include them. Whilst none of the twelve papers explicitly addressed the research 
questions of this review, they all produced findings that had a bearing on them to 
some degree. The findings reported are therefore indirect rather than direct. The 
discussion of this review allows for the application of existing psychological 
knowledge to potentially develop new understanding of individuals who engage in 
violent extremism.  
The overall bias for the papers was low. However, the level of research 
methodology used within each paper of this review is the lowest in the hierarchy of 
evidence (NICE, 2005). Relying on open source data, including court reports, media 
reports or police databases has its limitations, such as reporting bias, reliability or 
validity difficulties. Conclusions drawn should therefore be treated with caution. The 
studies reviewed different types of terrorists, such as Jihadist, al-Qaeda inspired or 
right-wing so again drawing conclusions that can be applied to all violent extremists 
is difficult. One of the greatest challenges in reviewing the empirical and academic 
literature regarding terrorism is both the type of and variation of its definition. It has 
been estimated that there are over a hundred definitions of terrorism within the 
literature (Piccinni, Marazziti & Veltri, 2017). This in itself creates difficulties when 




Furthermore, the samples in the review vary in terms of whether they are 
group or lone actors. Research has highlighted differences between these samples 
(Gill et al., 2016) again reducing the generalizability of the results to all terrorists.  
One conclusion that can be drawn from this review is that there is empirical 
evidence for an association between criminality and terrorism. It is clear from the 
review that criminality typically precedes violent extremism to some degree. These 
findings have also been cited in additional journal articles (Aly, 2016; Dearden, 
2016), that were omitted from this review because they did not fit the inclusion 
criteria.  
It has also been reported that individuals with criminal backgrounds have 
become more attractive targets for terrorists to recruit, due to their pre-existing 
criminal skills, such as access to weapons or ability to forge documents, as well as 
their vulnerability to radicalisation (Basra et al., 2016). This is supported by evidence 
which highlights the high levels of radicalisation that occurs within prison settings. 
Within this review Basra et al., (2016), reported 18% of their sample had been 
radicalised during their time in prison. Furthermore, Ljujic et al., (2017) reported a 
third of their sample, having experienced previous imprisonment, had been 
radicalised within the prison environment. That said however, it could be questioned 
whether radicalisation in prison is linked to criminality or other vulnerability factors 
that may be present in these individuals, such as isolation or deprivation. It is likely 
that it is the combination of these factors, which increase the likelihood of an 
individual being radicalised.  
37 
 
Although the review is able to answer the first question of association of 
criminal history, it does not provide conclusive evidence relating to the function of the 
criminality. Makarenko (2004) identify that it is difficult to distinguish between 
motivations for criminals and terrorists. Chermak et al., (2010) raise concern that 
little research has been undertaken to explore the criminal histories of extremist 
offenders, which they believe needs to be addressed before a true understanding of 
ideological crime can be achieved. Basra et al., (2016) provided hypotheses within 
their paper relating to the functional link, including a redemption narrative, 
legitimising crime or funding terrorism.  Some evidence was found within this review 
for these hypotheses. Porter & Kebbell (2011) suggest that ‘ideology’ legitimises the 
use of violence but that the motivation is complex and lies elsewhere. Common 
crime may be attractive to terrorists because of the practical and logistic skills it 
offers such as falsifying documents (Ljujic et al, 2017).  
Hutchinson and O’Malley (2007) argue that there is a difference in the 
function of criminal behaviour for terrorists. They suggest that organised criminals 
aim to maximise illegal profit through the engagement in terrorism, whereas ‘true’ 
terrorists use crime as a way of supporting their goal or ideology (Hutchinson & 
O’Malley, 2007). Three of the studies in this review found evidence in their samples 
of engagement in criminal activities to gain funds (Porter & Kebbell, 2011; Horgan et 
al., 2016; Basra et al., 2016). Other areas of research have concluded that terrorist 
groups engage in activities such as kidnapping, burglaries and drug trafficking to 
gain funds for their activities (Hutchinson & O’Malley, 2007; Wang & Wang, 2009; 
Meierrieks & Schneider, 2016). However, does the function of the crime differ for 
those who commit acquisitive crimes and those who commit violent crimes? It is 
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difficult to draw robust conclusions from this review to answer this.  All of the studies 
collate their data and provide overall conclusions, rather than exploring each crime 
individually. Chermak et al., (2010) suggest that some criminals who were financially 
driven have evolved to become ideologically driven offenders. McGarrell, Frelich & 
Chermak (2007) concluded that approximately 70% of individuals who were detained 
terrorists in Turkey linked to bombings were not committed to their ideology.  
An additional hypothesis for the function of criminality in terrorism could be to 
boost fragile self-esteem. Completing an act in the name of Allah or for a group goal 
may provide a sense of supremacy or worth for an individual who may otherwise 
have been seen as worthless in their community or society due to their criminal 
history.  
Based upon this review it is clear that more research needs to be completed 
to understand fully the function of criminality within violent extremism and terrorism 
and to examine whether function varies across ideologies. 
 The evidence presented throughout this review highlights the challenges in 
looking for a single explanation to the problem of terrorism. Indeed, this suggests the 
need to explore a mixture of mental health and personality factors and criminal 
history, in addition to criminogenic factors such as low self-esteem, when reviewing 
the risk of individuals becoming radicalised and proceeding to commit a terrorist 
offence. This review further emphasises the complexity of these individuals involved 
in terrorism. Furthermore, it raises important questions about how professionals 
working within this field understand the function of an individual’s extremist 
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Exploring how Prevent professionals understand and formulate potential risk 
factors for different ideological groups.  
ABSTRACT 
Background: There are a number of risk assessments available for different forms 
of violence (Kropp, Hart, Webster & Eaves, 1995 & 1999: Quinsey, Harris, Rice & 
Cormier, 1998). However, extremist violence is an area with limited research 
regarding the effectiveness of risk assessments.  The Prevent Duty was introduced 
by the United Kingdom Government to support the prevention of terrorism.  
Aim: To explore how professionals within Prevent understand and formulate a range 
of potential risk factors for different ideological groups. 
Method: A Q-sort was used to explore the views and opinions of Prevent 
professionals. Thirty-nine statements were included within the Q-set. Participants 
were asked to complete the Q-sort in relation to Extreme-Right Wing ideology, 
Islamist ideology and No Specific ideology. Three factor analyses were completed 
on each Q-sort. 
Key findings: ‘Associating with members of extremist groups’ was considered the 
most helpful statement for Extreme Right Wing and Islamist ideology There was no 
consensus on any other statements in terms of their helpfulness in risk assessing 
referrals. The findings suggest the need for a formulation-based approach, 
considering the presence and relevance of risk factors for individuals referred to 
Prevent.   






Risk assessment  
 
Risk assessment relates to the gathering and interpretation of information 
relating to an individual’s likelihood of engaging in a behaviour of concern again in 
the future (Boer, Hart, Kropp & Webster, 1997). It allows areas of risk to be identified 
and interventions to be appropriately targeted (Borum, 2000). The process of 
managing risk is related to managing uncertainty (Cooke & Michie, 2010); there is no 
certainty that an individual will engage in future behaviour based on their past 
behaviour, though for clinicians it is often all that is available to inform a decision. 
Violence can take many different forms and the literature has identified the 
need for different risk assessments to assess different groups of criminals 
(Pressman & Flockton, 2012). They include risk assessments for psychopathy (PCL-
R; Hare 1991, 2003), domestic violence (SARA; Kropp, Hart, Webster & Eaves, 
1995 & 1999), youth violence (SAVRY; Borum, Bartel, & Forth, 2002), general 
violent behaviour (VRAG; Quinsey, Harris, Rice & Cormier, 1998) and extremist 
violence, for which several risk assessment protocols have been developed in recent 
years.   
Initially, risk assessments relied heavily on the views and judgement of the 
clinician to appraise the likelihood of future risk. They relied solely on their clinical 
experience, generating a purely subjective view rather than using the guidance of 
known risk factors (Singh, Grann & Frazel, 2011). A number of ethical, reliability and 
validity issues have been raised within the literature regarding this method of risk 
assessment (Singh et al., 2011). Subsequently, actuarial risk assessments were 
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developed. Within this method clinicians are provided with specific coding 
instructions for risk factors that have been found to have moderate to high predictive 
validity (Monahan, Steadman, Silver, Appelbaum, Robbins, Mulvey, Roth, Grisso, & 
Banks, 2001). Individuals are provided with an empirically based overall estimate of 
their risk of re-offending (Hanson & Howard, 2010) and typically placed into 
categories of risk, such as, low, medium or high. Although this form of standardised 
risk assessment has been praised for its consistency, validity and predictability 
(Singh et al., 2011; Hart, 1998; Wong & Gordon, 2006), criticism has focused on its 
lack of individual focus in predicting future risk, or the identification of clinically 
relevant treatment targets. As a result, a third approach has emerged based on 
structured professional judgment, a hybrid of actuarial assessment and professional 
judgment (Pederson, Rasmussen & Elsass, 2010). It allows for risk factors to be 
explored and rated, whilst the clinician utilises their professional judgment to 
consider how relevant they are for that individual (Lavoie, Guy & Douglas, 2009), 
providing a more individualised and formulation based assessment. Within this 
approach risk is seen as fluid and changeable rather than static and historical.   
 
Applicability to extremism 
 
Although there are now established evidence based risk assessments for 
general violence there has been debate about how applicable these are for 
assessing extremist violence (Dernevik, Beck, Grann, Hogue & McGuire, 2009; 
Egan, Cole, Cole, Alison, Alison, Waring & Elntib, 2016). In developing risk 
assessments for extremist violent offenders, the low base rates and their lack of 
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distinctive characteristics makes actuarial assessment difficult, risking over-
identification of risk in terms of sensitivity (true positives), and under-prediction of low 
risk in terms of specificity (true negatives) (Samra, 2017; Egan et al., 2016). With 
high levels of risk aversion associated with terrorism and its limited evidence base, it 
is important that those developing risk assessment methodologies pay particular 
attention to issues of reliability, validity and sensitivity.  It has been recommended 
that structured professional judgement (SPJ) risk assessments offer the best 
approach as they support change, allowing for relevant risk factors and in some 
cases allow idiosyncratic factors, to be added in (Monahan, 2012). For idiosyncratic 
and complex presentations, when the evidence base is thin this approach 
systematises individual case formulation (Monahan, 2012). 
 
Current risk assessments 
 
The last ten years has seen the development a number of frameworks for 
assessing the risk of initial engagement in extremist violence and of the risk of 
extremist re-offending.  
Violent Extremist Risk Assessment Version 2 (VERA-2; Pressman & 
Flockton, 2010) 
Pressman & Flockton (2010) devised the VERA-2. It takes an SPJ approach 
to the risk assessment of political violent extremists and terrorists, rating 31 risk 
factors as low, medium or high risk (Pressman & Flockton, 2012). The risk factors 
from four sectors: beliefs and attitudes, context and intent, history and capability and 
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commitment and motivation, are coded according to specific criteria (Pressman & 
Flockton, 2010).  
 
Extremism Risk Guidance -22+ (ERG 22+; Lloyd & Dean, 2015) 
The ERG 22+ was created in the United Kingdom based on direct empirical 
work with male prisoners convicted of terrorist offences, (Lloyd and Dean,2015).  It 
comprises 22 factors that emerged from casework with convicted terrorists as 
pathway influences, grouped within three areas: engagement (e.g. a possible 
grievance or need for status), intent (e.g. us and them thinking) and capability (e.g. 
the skills and the knowledge to commit acts of violent extremism, such as a previous 
criminal history or access to weapons). Items are rated as not present, partly 
present, strongly present or not relevant. An overall rating of minimal, some or 
significant risk is given for each area of engagement, intent and capability. The ‘+’ 
suffix allows any other risk factor that comes to light from the formulation to be 
added into the overall formulation of risk, ensuring that the framework can support 
work in progress (Lloyd & Dean, 2015).  
Identifying Vulnerable People (IVP) 
The IVP was created as a checklist to support practitioners on the front line 
(e.g. doctors, nurses, school teachers) to build awareness of the characteristics that 
may signal a vulnerability to radicalisation (Egan et al., 2016). A thematic analysis of 
open source data on British Muslims (Cole & Cole, 2009) who had either engaged in 
or been convicted of a terrorist offence (Cole, Alison, Cole & Alison, 2009), was 
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carried out to inform the 16 item checklist. It consists of items such as risk taking 
behaviour, violent rhetoric and cultural and religious isolation (Egan et al., 2016).   
Terrorist Radicalisation Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18; Meloy, 
Hoffmann, Guldimann, & James, 2012; Meloy & Yakeley, 2014) 
The TRAP-18 is a SPJ framework to assess ideologically-motivated violence 
in lone actor terrorists and consists of 18 characteristics that are coded as present, 
absent, or insufficient information by experienced assessors, as their actuarial 
weight is not established (Meloy, Hoffmann, Guldimann, & James, 2012; Meloy & 
Yakeley, 2014). This can create difficulties in in evaluating its effectiveness.  
It comprises two sets of indicators. The first set consists of eight proximal 
warning behaviours, including pathway, fixation and identification; whilst the second 
set explores ten distal characteristics for active monitoring, such as grievance, 
changing in thinking and emotion and dependence on a virtual community (Meloy & 
Gill, 2016).  
The Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) 
The VAF is a framework developed by the UK Government from the ERG22+ 
for Local Partnerships within Channel (a multi-agency meeting) to assess an 
individual’s vulnerability and identify areas of support, safeguarding them from the 
risk of radicalisation into terrorism. It includes the 22 factors of the ERG but relies 
largely on the 13 engagement factors that identify the vulnerabilities to engagement 
with a cause, extremist group or ideology that focuses on where protection can be 
provided. (HM Government, 2012). Any evidence of a developed intent to cause 
harm leads to a referral to law enforcement. 
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The use and formality of these assessments and guidelines varies. Although 
these risk assessments help to direct thoughts about risk and provide professionals 
with guidance about which factors should be considered it has to be noted that the 
world of terrorism is ever changing. Terrorist attacks, such as the Brussels attack or 
the London Bridge attack are very different to September 9/11. They required very 
little planning and organisation. As the world of terrorism changes it is likely that 
individuals becoming radicalised and engaging in extremist violence may also 
change.  The ERG 22+ for example was informed by the pathways of al-Qaeda 
inspired terrorists, which raises questions of how applicable is it as an assessment to 
the new breed of terrorists?  
As previously highlighted, within the field of violence there are specific risk 
assessments for different contexts of violence, which might also apply to extremism. 
Much of the attention of risk assessments with terrorists has been focused on 
working with individuals who have engaged in such behaviours, with less emphasis 
being placed on those who are at risk of radicalisation and future unlawful acts 
(Sarma, 2017). 
The ERG, VERA and TRAP-18 accommodate both criminal history and 
relevant mental health factors and allow for the flexibility of case formulation. Political 
context is also important for extremist offending and relies on the awareness of the 
assessor. Horgan, (2008) refers to ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors for extremist offenders. 
‘Pull’ factors include the role of ideology and proxy family members being involved 
and ‘push’ factors include a sense of grievance or identity issues (Horgan, 2008). 
Future risk assessments in the world of extremist offenders need to consider the 




Prevent Strategy  
 
In 2003 in a bid to combat terrorism in the UK the Government introduced an 
overall counter-terrorism strategy called Contest, which was reviewed in 2011 
(Home Office, 2011). The strategy works around four areas; Pursue (to stop attacks 
occurring), Prevent (to stop people from becoming terrorists or joining/supporting 
terrorist groups), Protect (to bolster protection against a possible attack) and Prepare 
(to mitigate the possible impact of a terror attack) (HM Government, 2011). This 
paper will focus on the Prevent stream of Contest.  
As specified Prevent is focused on stopping individuals from becoming 
radicalised or contributing to a terrorist attack, crossing the threshold from thoughts 
or feelings into criminal behaviour. Professionals in the Prevent Strategy are being 
asked to undertake risk assessments on the presence of factors or proxy measures 
that they think may increase the risk of engaging in extremism. This in itself is a 
difficult task when validated risk assessments are available for a specific subgroup, 
however this is not the case. Prevent professionals are required to make a 
judgement of a broad range of individuals and a range of risk factors. The VAF was 
specifically developed to help with this, to enable the authorities to make 
discriminations between those who were, to some extent, engaged with an extremist 
ideology and then to decide how they could be protected from crossing the threshold 
to having an intent to commit a terrorist offence.  
 




Assessing and understanding risk is a task that police officers and clinical 
staff within Prevent are required to undertake daily, yet little is known about how they 
assess and make decisions about risk. Are they all undertaking risk assessments in 
the same way or are there differences in how people understand and quantify risk? 
Although professionals use the VAF assessment this is only compulsory for 
individuals who are referred to Channel. Therefore, individuals that remain within the 
police led space may not have had a formal assessment.  
The aim of this study is to explore this further, addressing the question how 
do professionals within Prevent make sense of a range of potential risk factors for 

















Introduction to Q-Sort Methodology  
 
This study explores the opinions of professionals who work within the field of 
prevention of terrorism. It aims to understand how professionals formulate a range of 
personal factors during risk assessment. The Q-sort methodology scientifically 
studies human subjectivity (McKeown & Thomas, 1988). Q-sort methodology is 
interested in the views of individuals rather than the prevalence of different factors 
(Reid, Swift & Mehanna, 2017) and aims to understand, explain and compare 
participant’s viewpoints (Watts & Stenner, 2005). As such Q-sort methodology was 
considered appropriate for this research. 
Q-methodology was developed by William Stephenson in 1953 and has 
become an established method to explore attitudes of individuals relating to a 
specific topic (Klooster, Visser & de Jong, 2008). It combines both qualitative and 
quantitative elements, and requires the participants to rank a set of statements from 
across a range, e.g. from agree/helpful to disagree/unhelpful, according to a pre-
specified (i.e. normal) distribution (Klooster et al., 2008). There are four stages to a 
Q-methodology;  
1. First, devise a concourse of statements (Q-set): to create a set of 
statements that will elicit opinions, interpretations and attitudes from 
participants. 
2. Recruit participants (P-set): to reflect a group of persons whose opinions 
would be of interest. 
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3. Complete the Q-sort: by allowing each participant to rank the concourse of 
statements, from agree/helpful to disagree/unhelpful accordingly to a pre-
specified (e.g., normal) distribution.  
4. Analyse the data and factor interpretation: to identify the range of opinions 
that have been expressed on a topic, the persons who exemplify a 
particular opinion and the particular concourse statement that exemplify 
opinion groups and differentiate between opinion groups. 
 
Design of the concourse  
 
The first stage of Q-sort methodology is to define the concourse. This consists 
of statements which capture the ‘viewpoints’ and ‘vantage points’ of the particular 
research topic (Ellingsen, Storksen & Stephens, 2010). A range of methods can be 
used to complete this, including literature reviews, focus groups, interviews or 
themes from questionnaires (Corr, 2006; Ellinsten et al., 2010; Armatas, Vennn & 
Watson, 2014).  
To develop the concourse for this study data was analysed to identify 
statements. The data was from the National Police Chief’s Council (NPCC), 
available for Birmingham Solihull Mental Health Trust (BSMHFT). The data consists 
of information from the Prevent Database.   
Prevent Database - The data concerns referrals made to Prevent, about 
those who there have been radicalisation concerns in the community. In total there 
were 497 cases. It included data from nine Counter Terrorism Unit regions across 
England and Wales. Prior to it being used for this study the data had already been 
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anonymised and coded, using a coding template devised by BSMHFT. The NPCC 
consented to further analysis being completed. Ethical approval for the study was 
gained from the University of Birmingham (see Appendix D) which was amended 
following a change in the initial methodology proposed (Appendix E).  
Data cleaning/screening - The first step in designing the concourse was to 
clean the data. The original coding sheet of 71 factors was reviewed. Data was 
recoded so that zero represented an item when it was ‘not present’ and one 
represented ‘present’.  Due to the large set of potential predictor items and their 
inevitable co-linearity it was deemed appropriate to create blocks of related items, 
(see Table 5) which could be entered into a logical regression in a hierarchical 
fashion. 
The dependent variable represented “active behaviour”. This variable was 
coded using the Association of Chief Police Officers (now the NPCC) tier system. A 
value of one indicated tier 3: active behaviours (if evidence indicated that they had 
engaged in some sort of extremist type of behaviours, tacit support of the others or 
they had acted to inspire others). A value of zero indicated tier 2: no active 
behaviours (if they had expressed some extremist views or were associating 
(actively or passively) with others). 
 Individual logistic regressions were conducted for the three ideology groups; 




Table 5: Item Groups  
Item Group  Items  
Mental Health Needs  Diagnosed or symptoms of psychotic disorder; Diagnosed or 
symptoms of non-psychotic disorder; Diagnosed or symptoms 
of neurodevelopmental disorder; Diagnosed cognitive 
impairments; Diagnosed or possible personality disorder; 
Dysregulated behaviour or problems in this area; Problematic 
substance misuse 
Coping Style Use of threats or violence; Poor coping style; Chaotic lifestyle; 
Frequent requests for help. 
History Experienced childhood trauma; Bullied, Endured racism; 
Caregiver disruption in early years; Poor engagement in 
education; Peer delinquency at school; Military involvement.  
Identity  Recently changed religion; Experienced acculturation, Seeks 
belonging; Seeks power; Has become more religious, Issues 
with their identity, Seeks to threaten others. 
Personal Environment  House issues, Exposed to violence. 
Current Stressors Currently subject to abuse; Recent victim of crime; 
Experiencing life transition, Debt issues, Recently lost job or 
failed school, relationship breakdown.  
Mental Health Team  Known to no mental health services; Known to mental health 
services historically; Known to mental health teams currently; 
Subject to multi-agency working  
Offence History  Violent offender; Non-violent offender; Sexual offender; Hate 
crime offender; Anti-social offender. 
Personality Traits Impulsive; Vulnerable to exploitation; Low self-esteem  
Attitudes Express racist views; Endorse violence; Pro-criminal attitudes; 
Feeling aggrieved by others  
Relationships  Perpetrator of domestic violence; Victim of domestic violence; 




Identifying predictive items – Each of the three ideology groups (Islamist, 
Extreme Right-Wing and No Specific Ideology), were explored to identify blocks of 
items that were statistically associated with terrorism. If a block of items evidenced a 
significant association with “active behaviour” then the individual items of that block 
were regressed to the dependent variable. Individual predictors that evidence of 
significant association with the active behaviours for each group are shown in Table 
6 (Islamic items), Table 7 (Extreme-Right Wing items) and Table 8, (No Specific 
Ideology items).  
When statistically significant individual items within the block had been 
identified then area under the curve and its associated parameters were calculated 
using the pROC package in the R programming language (Robin, Turck, Hainard, 
Tiberti, Lisacek, Sanchez & Müller, 2011). 
Table 6: Islamist items in the ROC analysis 













Peer delinquency 2.69 1.06 6.51 0.011 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 2.85, p=0.091 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.024  
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.032 
AUC Model = 0.57 [0.4894-0.6411] 
 
Identity  Acculturation  1.74 0.64 7.43 0.006 
Seeks power 1.81 0.3 36.8 <0.01 
Issues with identity -1.45 0.67 4.71 0.03 
 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 50.03, p=<0.001 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.19  
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Factor set Items Beta SE T P 
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.26 




Exposed to extreme beliefs 1.51 0.42 13.06 <0.01 
Family involved in crime  -1.07 0.5 4.64 0.031 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 15.05, p=0.001 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.062  
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.083 
AUC Model = 0.594 [0.5334-0.6254] 
 
Current stressors  Subject to abuse 0.84 0.4 4.45 0.034 
Life transitions  0.82 0.27 9.09 0.003 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 14.72, p=0.001 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.061  
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.082 




Subject to multiagency working -0.5 0.27 3.48 0.062 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 3.5, p=0.061 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.015 
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.02 
AUC Model = 0.5607 [0.4971-0.6243] 
 
Offence history  Hate crime offender  2.47 0.803 9.5 0.002 
Anti-social offender -0.689 0.421 2.68 0.040 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 3.5, p=0.061 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.015 
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.02 
AUC Model = 0.554 [0.521-0.588] 
 
Personality traits  Vulnerable to exploitation  0.48 0.271 3.13 0.077 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 3.165, p=0.075 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.013 
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.018 
AUC Model = 0.501 [0.489-0.513] 
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Factor set Items Beta SE T P 
Attitudes  Expresses racist views 1.49 0.303 24.06 <0.01 
 Endorses violence 0.567 0.335 2.87 0.09 
 Feeling aggrieved by others 0.569 0.294 3.76 0.053 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 44.97, p=0.000 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.175 
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.234 
AUC Model = 0.698 [0.639-0.757] 
 
Current risk  To self  0.555 0.309 3.234 0.072 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 3.26, p=0.071 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.014 
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.019 
AUC Model = 0.551 [0.495-0.606] 
 
Cluster  Affective disorder  0.804 0.351 5.25 0.022 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 5.573, p=0.018 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.024  
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.031 
AUC Model = 0.501 [0.489-0.513] 
 
Table 7: Extreme Right-Wing items in the ROC analysis 















Chi^2 for the final Model = 2.85, p=0.091 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.024  
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.032 
AUC Model = 0.57 [0.4894-0.6411] 
 
Coping style Use of threats or violence 0.816 0.41 3.97 0.046 
Poor coping style -1.832 0.711 6.65 0.01 
Chaotic lifestyle 1.38 0.795 3.032 0.082 
Requests help 22.46 4.0192 <0.01 0.01 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 11.329, p=0.023 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.091  
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Factor set Items Beta SE T P 
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.121 
AUC Model = 0.6216 [0.5339-0.7094] 
 
History   Childhood trauma  1.149 0.835 3.17 0.075 
Bullied  -2.323 0.892 6.79 0.009 
Caregiver disruption  -1.505 0.824 3.34 0.068 
Peer delinquency at school  1.34 0.751 3.174 0.075 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 13.51, p=0.009 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.107  
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.143 
AUC Model = 0.5996 [0.5375-0.6616] 
 
Identity   Recently changed religion  -2.124 0.4 27.14 0.001 
Seeks power   1.345 0.27 0.4 0.001 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 14.85, p=0.001 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.117  
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.156 




Exposed to extreme beliefs 0.727 0.375 3.75 0.053 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 3.812, p=0.051 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.032 
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.042 




Known to no mental health   1.23 0.44 7.69 0.006 
Subject to multi-agency 
working  
-1.273 0.442 8.301 0.004 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 12.974, p=0.002 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.103 
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.138 
AUC Model = 0.6109 [0.5419-0.6798] 
 
Offence history   Hate crime offender   1.245 0.566 4.843 0.028 
Anti-social offender -0.809 0.486 2.773 0.096 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 6.691, p=0.035 
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Factor set Items Beta SE T P 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.055 
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.073 
AUC Model = 0.566 [0.499-0.632] 
 
Attitudes  Expresses racist views 2.25 0.813 7.652 0.006 
 Endorses violence 0.894 0.421 4.508 0.034 
 Pro-criminal attitudes  -0.842 0.434 3.765 0.052 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 21.96, p=0.000 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.169 
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.225 
AUC Model = 0.663 [0.58-0.746] 
 
Current risk  To self  0.89 0.383 5.399 0.02 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 5.55, p=0.18 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.046 
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.061 
AUC Model = 0.606 [0.519-0.693] 
 
Table 8: No Specific Ideology items in the ROC analysis  















Dysregulated behaviour or 
problems in this area  
1.027 0.566 3.298 0.069 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 7.443, p=0.024 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.057  
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.108 
AUC Model = 0.5534 [0.4688-0.638] 
 
Coping style Use of threats or violence 1.278 0.548 5.434 0.02 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 5.443, p=0.020 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.042  
 
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.079 




Factor set Items Beta SE T P 
History   Peer delinquency at school  2.523 0.953 6.921 0.009 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 6.632, p=0.010 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.051  
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.096 
AUC Model = 0.5847 [0.4851-0.6842] 
 
Identity  Seeks power   2.518 0.657 14.681 0 
      
Chi^2 for the final Model = 21.921, p=0.000 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.16  
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.3 
AUC Model = 0.5312 [0.47-0.5925] 
 
Community 
disorganisation   
Racial tensions  -21.083 2.141 <0.01 0.099 
Known gang activity  2.494 0.959 6.765 0.009 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 7.323, p=0.026 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.056 
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.106 
AUC Model = 0.585 [0.486-0.684] 
 
Current stressors   Subject to abuse   1.488 0.804 3.428 0.064 
Lost job or failed school   1.816 0.699 7.359 0.007 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 9.439, p=0.009 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.072 
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.135 
AUC Model = 0.5312 [0.47-0.5925] 
 
Mental health 
teams    
Known to no mental health 
team    
1.183 0.661 3.2 0.074 
 
 














Subject to multiagency 
working  
-1.301 0.571 5.182 0.023 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 8.451, p=0.038 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.065 
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Factor set Items Beta SE T P 
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.122 
AUC Model = 0.5249 [0.466-0.583] 
 
Offence history  Violent offender  0.972 0.553 3.093 0.079 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 2.955, p=0.086 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.023 
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.044 
AUC Model = 0.5249 [0.466-0.583] 
 
Personality traits  Vulnerable to exploitation  1.394 0.668 4.348 0.037 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 5.325, p=0.021 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.041 
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.078 
AUC Model = 0.5249 [0.466-0.583] 
 
Attitudes Expresses racist views 1.256 0.71 3.134 0.077 
Endorses violence  1.011 0.608 2.76 0.096 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 9.183, p=0.01 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.07 
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.132 
AUC Model = 0.5249 [0.466-0.583] 
 
Current risk  To others  0.993 0.552 3.229 0.072 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 3.354, p=0.067 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.026 
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.049 
AUC Model = 0.5249 [0.466-0.583] 
 
Cluster  Further assessment needed  -1.946 0.596 10.667 0.001 
Chi^2 for the final Model = 9.901, p=0.002 
Cox and Snell R^2 for the final Model = 0.076 
Nagelkerke R Square for final Model = 0.142 
AUC Model = 0.5249 [0.466-0.583] 
 
Summary and Interpretation – The logistic regressions resulted in 18 items 
within 10 categories being identified as predictive active behaviour items for the 
68 
 
Islamist group. Extreme-Right Wing analysis resulted in 17 items from nine 
categories and No Specific Ideology resulted in 16 items from eight categories. 
When the duplication of items was accounted for 39 items in total were included in 
the Q-set (see Appendix F).  
Critique of this methodology - It is worth noting at this point that there are 
both strengths and weaknesses in devising the concourse from this data. It is rare to 
have raw clinical data from terrorism referrals. However, given that multiple 
individuals coded this data during the collection and anonymising of the data, the 
reliability of the coding of these factors remains unknown. Particularly, it is unclear if 
a coding of a zero represents that the factor is not present for that individual or 
whether it is missing information or not known. This ambiguity in the coding of the 
data obfuscates the interpretation of the items and categories within the predictive 
model.  
Nevertheless, following the completion of the logistic regression and ROC 
analysis the importance of the 39 identified items could be further explored as a 
concourse within a Q-sort. The Q-sort analysis would identify different “narratives” 
regarding the importance and interpretation of the items that were statistically 
identified as predictive of active behaviours within the three ideology groups.  
 
Pilot Test  
 
A Q-sort pilot test was completed using a sample of five participants with no 
experience of working within the field of terrorism. The purpose of the pilot test was 
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to ensure that the instructions for the Q-sort were clear and that the factors were 




Participants for this study were drawn from professionals who work within 
Prevent in the West Midlands and London, including police officers, psychologists, 
community psychiatric nurses and psychiatrists. In total there were 22 participants, 
seven clinicians (1 Psychiatrists, 4 Community Nurse Practitioners and 2 
Psychologists) and 15 Prevent police officers.  
Webler, Danielson & Tuler, (2009) recommended that there should be three 
statements for every one participant.  According, to this criterion the sample size 
should be adequate to identify grouping of opinions regarding the importance and 




The Q-sort was completed face to face in a range of locations (e.g. police 
stations or mental health hospitals), as was convenient for the participant. 
Participants were required to complete a consent form prior to commencing the Q-
sort (Appendix G). All 39 statements were individually printed, laminated and 
randomly assigned a number to assist the researcher in logging the placement in the 
grid. Each participant received a set of instructions for the completion of the grid, first 
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relating to individuals vulnerable to supporting or being drawn towards Extreme 
Right-Wing ideology (Appendix H).  
Initially, respondents read and sorted the cards into three groups; helpful, 
unhelp and unsure. Then participants reviewed the statements in each group and 
began placing them upon a response grid (Appendix I). This forced the respondent 
to rank responses to a predefined symmetrical and approximately normal 
distribution. Participants had the final decisions of whether they started with helpful 
or unhelpful cards.  
Once the grid was completed the card numbers were recorded by the 
researcher on a record sheet (see Appendix J) and removed from the grid. The 
participants were then provided with a new set of instructions (Appendix K) to 
complete the grid in relation to individuals vulnerable to supporting or being drawn 
towards Islamist ideology. The process of card sorting and grid completion remained 
the same. Once the grid had been completed and responses recorded the cards 
were removed. Participants were then provided with a final set of instructions to 
complete the grid in relation to those who may be drawn towards extremist 
behaviour supporting No Specific Ideology (Appendix K). Again the process of 











Twenty-two participants completed Q-sorts for each ideology were analysed 
using a software package ‘QMethod’ (Zabala, 2014), in the R programming language 
(R Core Team, 2018). This method included a varimax rotation (Tables 9, 10, 12, 13, 
15 and 16; contention statements differentiate one group from another, with 
consensus statements being true for all groups). For ease of interpretation, it was 
decided to limit the factor analysis to a maximum of three factors. The same factor 
analysis methodology was followed for the three different ideology groups. The 
results of each of the individual ideology groups are presented below. Labels were 
identified for each factor group by exploring the characteristics that were considered 
to be helpful within that group and summarising these.  
 
Extreme-Right Wing  
 
The three factors identified from factor analysis for this group can be seen in 
Table 5. One of the three factors (Table 9) could describe all 22 of the participants. 
The closer the score of the participant is to one the more they can be said to be 
represented by the factor (Webler, Danielson & Tuler, 2009).  The profession of each 
respondent is included within Table 9. Each of the factors represents a collection of 
individual points of view that are highly correlated with each other. None of the 
participants within the sample loaded on to more than once of the factors. This 
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suggests that the factors have a level of independence from each other (Webler et 
al., 2009).  
Table 9: Factor Matrix for Extreme-Right Wing Q-Sorts 







R1 Prevent Officer  -0.1402428 0.5914698 0.3010368 
R2 Prevent Officer  0.7902473 0.2620400 0.1539814 
R3 Prevent Officer  0.0862314 -0.1922458 0.6053636 
R4 Prevent Officer  0.4801570 0.3413585 0.6271132 
R5 Prevent Officer  0.3990311 0.7300402 -0.0235487 
R6 Prevent Officer  0.0510795 0.8134688 0.1415270 
R7 Prevent Officer  0.3664705 0.7222695 0.0208545 
R8 Clinician  0.5279219 0.1988383 0.4415986 
R9 Prevent Officer  0.0801532 0.0958572 0.8363043 
R10 Prevent Officer  0.3944867 0.2935973 0.5944754 
R11 Prevent Officer  0.7617092 0.1403199 0.1107112 
R12 Clinician  0.6050031 0.0275625 0.4556142 
R13 Prevent Officer 0.5478513 0.4989202 -0.0370403 
R14 Clinician  0.7192935 -0.0417619 0.4048587 
R15 Prevent Officer  0.7153699 0.2304455 0.0453967 
R16 Prevent Officer  0.6048692 0.3346811 -0.0182175 
R17 Prevent Officer  0.0896440 0.3621694 0.6670009 
R18 Clinician  0.7622157 0.1903996 0.1994985 
R19 Clinician  0.1843036 0.5157071 0.0250116 
R20 Prevent Officer  0.6438932 0.3674908 0.2524979 
R21 Clinician  0.3410341 0.4910964 0.1089573 
R22 Clinician  0.6399687 0.0222859 0.0530272 
Bold represents person defining factors  
 
Table 10 presents a summary of the data with the distinguishing statements 
for each of the three factors, along with statements that distinguish all and are a 
consensus for all factor groups. It includes the Eigen values which relates to the 
variance extracted from each factor (Reid, Swift & Mehanna, 2017). The difference 
between the z-scores for the statements is also presented. The three factors account 
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for 58% of the variance. Study variance greater than 40% is deemed to be a credible 
solution to the factors (Watts & Stenner, 2005).  


















11 5.824 26 Q22. Has been diagnosed with 
or experiences symptoms of 
cognitive impairment  0.698** 1.005**** 0.308 
Q24. Experiences of trauma 
during their childhood -1.366**** -1.189**** 0.176 
Q27. They seek to threaten 
others 1.363**** 1.355**** -0.008 
Q28. Make frequent requests for 
help from other people to cope 0.644** 1.117*** 0.473 






6 3.69 17 Q2. Live a chaotic lifestyle 1.402**** 0.042 -1.360*** 
Q9. They seek power 2.052**** -0.066 -2.12**** 
Q10. They express/hold feelings 
of being aggrieved by others 1.245**** -0.048 -1.293*** 
Q13. Have poor coping styles  0.919*** -0.003 -0.922** 
Q15. They have recently 
experienced a life trauma  1.140*** 0.019 -1.121*** 
Q20. They have recently 
changed religion  -0.493* 0.499 0.942** 
Q33. They have been known to 
no mental health -1.851**** -0.149 1.702**** 
Q37. They experience issues 





5 3.373 15 Q3. They are a current risk to 
themselves -0.298 1.760**** 2.058**** 
Q11. They experience racial 
tension within their local 
community  0.471 -0.843** -1.315*** 
Q12. Experienced acculturation  0.032 -1.443**** -1.76**** 
Q14. They have been known to 
mental health historically  -0.175 1.016*** 1.190*** 
Q29. Peer delinquency at school -0.175 -1.384**** -1.208*** 
Q34. They express/hold racist 
views 0.19 -0.563* -0.753* 
Q36. They have a history of hate 
crime offence(s) 0.167 1.763**** 1.596**** 
Distinguish all factor groups Q1. Needs further assessment -1.346**** 0.846** 2.192**** 
Q7. They are vulnerable to 
exploitation  -1.576**** -0.698** 0.878** 
Q8. Experiences of Affective 
















Q16. Experiences dysregulated 
behaviour or problems in that 
area -0.603* 0.842** 1.445**** 
Q17. They have recently lost 
their job or failed school 0.539* -1.158*** -1.70**** 
Q18. They have a history of 
violent offense(s) 1.156*** 1.974**** 0.818** 
Q21. They have been exposed 
to extremist beliefs -1.731**** -0.548* 1.182*** 
Q25. Has been diagnosed with 
or experiences symptoms of a 
neurodevelopmental disorder -1.553**** -0.693**** 0.840** 
Q26. They are a current risk to 
others 0.596* 1.670**** 1.074*** 
Q30. Members of their family 
are/have been involved in crime -0.543* -1.222*** -0.678* 
Q31. Being the victim of bullying 
during their early years 0.811** -1.832**** -1.021*** 
Consensus for all factor groups  Q4. They have a history of anti-
social offence(s) 0.315 -0.086 -0.401 
Q5. They have been subject to 
multi-agency working 0.234 0.346 0.112 
Q6. There is known gang activity 
within the local community  -0.32 -0.184 0.136 
Q19. They associate with 
members of extremist groups  -0.265 0.167 0.431 
Q32. Use threats or violence to 
cope 0.013 -0.245 -0.258 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, ****p<.0001 
Statements are also placed in order from consensus to contention, dependant 
on the range of variance in where the statement cards were placed (Table 11). This 
was based on the variance of the position number where each statement could be 
placed by participants. The statement that all three factors agreed on in relation to its 
placement for Extreme-Ring Wing was ‘they have recently changed religion.’ All 
three factors placed this statement as the least helpful for this group. There were five 
statements that created the highest level of contention. These were; ‘needs further 
assessment,’ ‘they are a current risk to themselves,’ ‘they seek power,’ ‘they have a 
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history of violent offences’ and ‘being the victim of bullying during their early years.’  
The three factors are discussed in more detail.  
 
Table 11: Factors from consensus to contention for Extreme-Right Wing Q-Sort.  













Q20. They have recently changed religion -4 -4 -4 0 
Q4. They have a history of anti-social offence(s) 0 -1 0 1 
Q5. They have been subject to multiagency working 0 0 -1 1 
Q6. There is known gang activity within the local 
community -4 -3 -3 1 
Q19. They associate with members of extremist groups 4 4 3 1 
Q32. Use threats or violence to cope 0 0 1 1 
Q34. They express/hold racist views 3 3 4 1 
Q39. Currently experiencing some form of abuse -1 0 -1 1 
Q13. Have poor coping styles 1 -1 0 2 
Q14. They have been known to mental health 
historically 0 0 -2 2 
Q22. Has been diagnosed with or experiences 
symptoms of cognitive impairment -1 -3 -3 2 
Q23. They express/hold pro-criminal attitudes -1 0 1 2 
Q25. Has been diagnosed with or experiences 
symptoms of a neurodevelopmental disorder 1 3 3 2 
Q27. They seek to threaten others 2 0 0 2 
Q28. Make frequent requests for help from others to 
cope -1 -2 -3 2 
Q30. Members of their family are/have been involved in 
crime -3 -3 -1 2 
Q37. They experience issues with their identity 1 -1 1 2 
Q38. They endorse violence 3 1 1 2 
Q35. Experiences of caregiver disruption during their 
early years -3 -4 -2 2 
Q2. Live a chaotic lifestyle 1 -2 0 3 
Q7. They are vulnerable to exploitation 0 3 2 3 
Q10. They express/hold feelings of being aggrieved by 
others 3 1 4 3 
Q11. They experience racial tensions within their local 
community 0 -1 2 3 
Q15. They have recently experienced a life trauma 2 -1 1 3 
Q21. They have been exposed to extremist beliefs 1 4 2 3 
Q24. Experiences of trauma during their childhood -2 1 0 3 
Q26. They are a current risk to others 2 2 -1 3 
Q29. Peer delinquency at school -3 -3 0 3 
Q8. Experiences of Affective Disorder -2 2 0 4 
76 
 













Q12. Experienced acculturation -2 -3 1 4 
Q16. Experiences dysregulated behaviour or problems 
in that area 0 2 -2 4 
Q17. They have recently lost their job or failed school -1 -2 2 4 
Q33. They have been known to no mental health team -3 1 -2 4 
Q36. They have a history of hate crime offence(s) 3 3 -1 4 
Q1. Needs further assessment -1 2 -3 5 
Q3. They are a current risk to themselves 1 1 -4 5 
Q9. They seek power 2 -2 3 5 
Q18. They have a history of violent offence(s) 4 1 -1 5 
Q31. Being the victim of bullying during their early 
years -2 0 3 5 
 
Threatening & vulnerable: The participants associated with this factor 
believed that knowing if the individual ‘seeks to threaten others’ is a helpful 
statement. There was a belief that you may threaten others if you feel that they are 
to blame for the wrongdoings in your life or use it as a means of coping. They 
believed that ‘experiencing trauma during their childhood’ was helpful. Along with 
knowing that the individual has ‘a diagnosis or symptoms of a cognitive impairment’ 
is as helpful or knowing that ‘they make frequent requests for help’ and ‘endorses 
violence’. Statements relating to identity were considered to helpful, especially 
holding the view that they had ‘been aggrieved by others’, along with ‘experiencing a 
life trauma.’ It was felt that if someone was ‘currently experiencing a life trauma’ then 
they would be more likely to want to be part of something, such as an extremist act 
and feel that they had nothing to lose as a consequence of their actions.   
Racist/extremist emotionally vulnerable:  The participants associated with 
this factor believed that knowing that the individual had ‘changed religion’ or they 
had ‘been known to no mental health’ were the least helpful statement for this group. 
It was believed that Extreme-Right Wing extremists may have ‘symptoms or 
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diagnosis of neurodevelopmental disorder’, ‘affective disorder’ or ‘dysregulated 
emotions or problems in that area.’ Furthermore, they believed that it would be 
helpful to know if the individual had a ‘history of hate crime offences’, suggesting that 
they are actually willing to put thoughts into action, rather than just talking about their 
views. 
Racist aggrieved power seekers: The participants associated with this 
factor believed ‘expressing or holding views of a racist nature’, which were linked to 
‘us ‘and ‘them’ views, which were considered an indicator for stronger racist views. 
In addition, ‘experiencing racial tension in their community’. They did not believe it 
was helpful to know if the individual had ‘experienced acculturation’ or if they ‘got 
into trouble at school with their peers’. However, knowing that they had been a 
‘victim of bullying in their early years’ or ‘seek power’ were helpful. 
Islamist  
 
The three factors identified from factor analysis for this group can be seen in 
Table 12. Of the 22 participants nineteen could be described by one of the three 
factors. Participants two, seven and eight did not load on to any of the factors and 
therefore cannot be said to belong to any of the factors. None of the participants 
within the sample loaded on to more than one of the factors.  
 
Table 12: Factor Matrix for Islamist Q-Sorts 







R1 Prevent Officer  0.7320532 -0.2401255 0.2214969 
R2* Prevent Officer  0.3685188 0.4128562 0.4961091 
R3 Prevent Officer  0.0715848 0.2367407 0.5311103 
R4 Prevent Officer  0.4263724 0.6982665 0.1509483 
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R5 Prevent Officer  0.1852104 0.2623044 0.7245802 
R6 Prevent Officer  0.2110526 0.0953235 0.7500535 
R7* Prevent Officer  0.0546007 0.4132119 0.4780643 
R8* Clinician  0.0544583 -0.2206637 0.0565219 
R9 Prevent Officer  0.6866863 0.3491724 0.1240871 
R10 Prevent Officer  0.7484487 0.0563936 0.2458987 
R11 Prevent Officer  0.0712659 0.7192800 0.3729398 
R12 Clinician  0.6300896 0.2987501 0.1192969 
R13 Prevent Officer 0.1260219 0.6780814 0.3509382 
R14 Clinician  0.6647089 0.4984620 0.0447326 
R15 Prevent Officer  0.1608861 0.7255656 0.2994559 
R16 Prevent Officer  0.4191704 0.5661187 0.1466845 
R17 Prevent Officer  0.7655380 0.1812375 0.0629489 
R18 Clinician  0.5324132 0.4900069 -0.0770811 
R19 Clinician  -0.0930102 0.1783305 0.6002708 
R20 Prevent Officer  0.0120617 0.8174691 0.1733143 
R21 Clinician  0.2636620 0.1815098 0.5090528 
R22 Clinician  0.5404951 0.3625599 0.2043839 
Bold represents person defining factors 
*Does not load onto any of the factors  
 
Table 13 displays the distinguishing statements for the Islamist extremists. 
These factors account for 58% of the variance, suggesting a credible solution to the 
factors (Watts & Stenner, 2005).  
Table 13: Distinguishing Statements for each Factor, Eigen values and difference in 
Z scores.  
Factor N Eigen Value 
% 
variance Q statement 
Factor 1 
 Vs Factor 
2 
Factor 1 
 Vs Factor 
3 
Factor 2  
Vs 






8 4.865 22 Q26. They are a current risk to others -1.175 -0.899** 0.276 
Q10. They express/hold feelings of 
being aggrieved by others 0.683* 1.247*** 0.564 
Q3. They are a current risk to 
themselves -1.905**** -2.052**** -0.147 
Q23. They express/hold pro-criminal 
attitudes 0.554* 0.960*** 0.406 
Q5. They have been subject to 
multiagency working  0.542* 0.975*** 0.433 
Q11. They experience racial tension 
within their local community  1.344**** 1.424**** 0.08 
Q12. Experienced acculturation  1.534**** 1.259*** -0.276 
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Factor N Eigen Value 
% 
variance Q statement 
Factor 1 
 Vs Factor 
2 
Factor 1 
 Vs Factor 
3 
Factor 2  
Vs 
 Factor 3 
Q4. They have a history of anti-social 
offence(s) 1.393**** 1.967**** 0.575 




6 4.513 21 Q27. They seek to threaten others -1.120*** -0.264 0.856** 
Q7. They are vulnerable to 
exploitation  1.545**** -0.338 
-
1.883**** 
Q13. Have poor coping styles  0.646* -0.052 -0.697* 
Q17. They have recently lost their job 
or failed school 0.636* -0.025 -0.660* 
Q30. Members of their family are/have 





5 3.402 15 Q37. They experience issues with 
their identity  0.182 1.472**** 1.290*** 
Q34. They express/hold racist views 0.455 1.205*** 0.750* 
Q14. They have been known to 
mental health historically  -0.067 -0.851** -0.784** 
Q16. Experiences dysregulated 
behaviour or problems in that area 0.433 -0.626* -1.059*** 
Q1. Needs further assessment  -0.237 -1.273*** -1.036*** 
Q35. Experiences of caregiver 
disruption during their early years  -0.034 1.232*** 1.266*** 
Distinguishes all factor groups  Q2. Live a chaotic lifestyle -0.74** 1.212*** 1.953**** 
Q8. Experiences of Affective Disorder -0.826** -2.270**** -1.44**** 
Q9. They seek power -2.057**** -0.887** 1.170*** 
Q18. They have a history of violent 
offense(s) -1.868**** -0.964*** 0.903** 
Q20. They have recently changed 
religion  2.456**** 0.867** -1.59**** 
Q22. Has been diagnosed with or 
experiences symptoms of cognitive 
impairment -0.543* -1.359**** -0.816** 
Q25. Has been diagnosed with or 
experiences symptoms of 
neurodevelopmental disorder -0.621* -1.328**** -0.707* 
Q33. They have been known to no 
mental health team -0.590* -2.046**** -1.46**** 
Q36. They have a history of hate 
crime offense(s) -0.691** 0.719* 1.410**** 
Q38. They endorse violence -1.038*** 0.922*** 1.960**** 
Consensus for all factor groups  Q6. There is known gang activity in 
the local community 0.039 0.061 0.022 
Q15. They have recently experienced 
a life trauma 0.505 0.254 -0.251 
Q19. They associate with member of 
extremist groups  -0.123 -0.153 -0.03 
Q31. Being the victim of bullying 
during their early years 0.06 0.193 0.133 
Q39. Currently experiencing some 
form of abuse 0.147 0.027 -0.12 




Table 14 displays the statements in order from consensus. The statement 
with complete agreement between the three factors was ‘they associate with 
members of extremist groups’, which was identified as the most helpful statement for 
Islamist extremists.  The statement that created the most contention was ‘they have 
recently changed religion’.  
 











Q19. They associate with members of extremist groups 4 4 4 0 
Q31. Being the victim of bullying during their early 
years 0 0 -1 1 
Q32. Use threats or violence to cope 0 1 0 1 
Q15. They have recently experienced a life trauma 1 0 0 1 
Q17. They have recently lost their job or failed school 0 -1 -1 1 
Q6. There is known gang activity within the local 
community -4 -4 -3 1 
Q21. They have been exposed to extremist beliefs 3 3 4 1 
Q28. Make frequent requests for help from others to 
cope -4 -3 -3 1 
Q39. Currently experiencing some form of abuse -1 -1 -2 1 
Q13. Have poor coping styles 0 -1 1 2 
Q14. They have been known to mental health 
historically -1 0 1 2 
Q16. Experiences dysregulated behaviour or problems 
in that area 0 -1 1 2 
Q24. Experiences of trauma during their childhood -3 -2 -1 2 
Q26. hey are a current risk to others 1 3 3 2 
Q27. They seek to threaten others 0 2 0 2 
Q30. Members of their family are/have been involved in 
crime -1 -3 -2 2 
Q34. They express/hold racist views 3 2 1 2 
Q35. Experiences of caregiver disruption during their 
early years -2 -2 -4 2 
Q36. They have a history of hate crime offence(s) 1 1 -1 2 
Q1. Needs further assessment -2 -2 1 3 
Q5. They have been subject to multiagency working 1 0 -2 3 
Q7. They are vulnerable to exploitation 3 0 3 3 
Q10. They express/hold feelings of being aggrieved by 













Q11. They experience racial tensions within their local 
community 2 0 -1 3 
Q12. Experienced acculturation 1 -2 -2 3 
Q18. They have a history of violent offence(s) 0 3 2 3 
Q22. Has been diagnosed with or experiences 
symptoms of cognitive impairment -3 -1 0 3 
Q23. They express/hold pro-criminal attitudes 2 1 -1 3 
Q29. Peer delinquency at school -1 -4 -3 3 
Q37. They experience issues with their identity 2 3 0 3 
Q4. They have a history of anti-social offence(s) 1 -3 -3 4 
Q25. Has been diagnosed with or experiences 
symptoms of a neurodevelopmental disorder -1 1 3 4 
Q9. They seek power -2 2 0 4 
Q38. They endorse violence 2 4 0 4 
Q2. Live a chaotic lifestyle -1 1 -4 5 
Q3. They are a current risk to themselves -3 1 2 5 
Q33. They have been to known to no mental health 
team -3 -1 2 5 
Q8. Experiences of Affective Disorder -2 0 3 5 
Q20. They have recently changed religion 3 -3 2 6 
 
        Pro-criminal racist/extremist views: The participants in this factor believed 
that it was helpful to know if the individual had been ‘exposed to extremist views’, 
‘hold racist views’ and ‘express/hold pro-criminal attitudes’. It was also believed 
helpful to know if the individual was ‘feeling aggrieved’ with others. It was believed to 
be less helpful if they had ‘experienced peer delinquency at school’ or made 
‘frequent requests for help’. This group considered ‘tension in their local community’ 
and having experienced ‘multiagency support’ as things that were in the middle in 
relation to their helpfulness.  
        Violent power seekers: This group of participants did not believe that ‘family 
members being involved in crime’ would help them when risk assessing and 
formulating. ‘Recently losing their job or failing at school’ was also a statement that 
was not considered very helpful. The participants believed that knowing if the 
individual ‘seeks to threaten others’ or ‘seeks power’ would be helpful suggesting 
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that threatening people is a sense of empowerment or dominance. They placed 
being vulnerable to exploitation as neither helpful or unhelpful, whilst ‘history of 
violent offences’ and ‘endorse violence’ were considered as helpful. Furthermore, 
believed that knowing that the individual had ‘issues with their identity’ was a helpful 
factor for this group. This was linked to them not feeling that they belonged or 
knowing where they fit in with society. 
          Risky emotionally vulnerable: The participants in this factor believed that 
the individual experiencing an ‘affective disorder’ or ‘symptoms or diagnosis of 
neurodevelopmental disorder’ was helpful. Furthermore, knowing that the individual 
is ‘a risk to others’ was helpful, along with ‘expressing or holding racist views’. They 
believed that knowing an individual had ‘experienced care giver disruption’ as less 
helpful, often commenting that they believed that individuals that support an Islamist 
ideology come from stable homes and family lifestyles. ‘Needs further assessment’ 




No Specific Ideology  
 
The three factors identified from factor analysis for this group can be seen in 
Table 15. Of the 22 participants 21 could be described by one of the three factors. 
Participant three did not load on to any of the factors and therefore cannot be said to 
belong to any of the factors. Participants loaded onto one factor only.  
 The distinguishing statements are represented inn Table 16. The three factors 
account for 54% of the variance, thus a credible solution to the factors.  
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Table 15: Factor Matrix for No Specific Ideology Q-Sorts  
Respondent Profession Power seekers Complex needs  Violent extremists 
R1 Prevent Officer  0.5884403 0.1347607 -0.1553299 
R2 Prevent Officer  0.4025894 0.3191295 0.2094361 
R3* Prevent Officer  -0.1528094 -0.0041390 0.1002989 
R4 Prevent Officer  0.7836741 -0.0258198 0.3414141 
R5 Prevent Officer  0.3846859 0.6532460 0.1898464 
R6 Prevent Officer  0.0002738 0.8090142 0.2858313 
R7 Prevent Officer  0.0505730 0.7177811 -0.0679693 
R8 Clinician  0.5154441 0.0268135 0.0384611 
R9 Prevent Officer  -0.0438035 0.7241373 0.2161207 
R10 Prevent Officer  0.7524879 -0.0409243 0.2361655 
R11 Prevent Officer  0.6769419 0.0412661 0.4380049 
R12 Clinician  0.6820136 0.2179095 0.2339410 
R13 Prevent Officer -0.1079179 0.0966631 0.8169363 
R14 Clinician  0.8155403 -0.2870076 0.2539328 
R15 Prevent Officer  0.6655644 0.4653246 -0.1849273 
R16 Prevent Officer  0.7569417 0.0774653 -0.1035815 
R17 Prevent Officer  0.6692146 0.1602954 -0.0240607 
R18 Clinician  0.5532560 -0.3126602 0.3732802 
R19 Clinician  0.1907324 0.3768336 0.5986829 
R20 Prevent Officer  0.6967462 0.2683816 0.1855731 
R21 Clinician  0.5521120 0.3389359 -0.1535547 
R22 Clinician  0.1311522 0.1459150 0.6036604 
Bold represents person defining factors  
*Does not load onto any of the factors  
 
As Table 17 shows for No Specific Ideology, there was no one statement that 
all three factors agreed on. The smallest range of contention was one, which 
included the statements; ‘they are a current risk to themselves’, ‘they have been 
subject to multiagency working’, ‘there is known gang activity within the local 
community’, ‘they are vulnerable to exploitation’, ‘experienced acculturation’, ‘they 
seek to threaten others’, ‘make frequent requests from others to cope’, ‘experiences 
of caregiver disruption during their early years’, ‘currently experiencing some form of 
abuse’ and ‘members of their family are/have been involved in crime’. The statement 
that caused the most contention was ‘they have been exposed to extremist beliefs’, 
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with some participants ranking it as the most helpful whilst others stated it was the 
least helpful. 
Table 16: Distinguishing Statements for each Factor, Eigen values and difference in 
Z scores.  
Factor n Eigen Value 
% 









 Factor 3 
Power 
seekers (1) 
14 6.344 29 Q10. They express/hold feelings of 
being aggrieved by others 1.566**** 1.400*** -0.166 
Q20. They have recently changed 
religion  -1.936**** -2.017**** -0.081 
Q23. They express/hold pro-criminal 
attitudes 1.058*** 0.780* -0.278 
Q21. They have been exposed to 
extremist beliefs -2.647**** -3.238**** -0.591 
Q27. They seek to threaten others 0.761** 1.034*** 0.273 
Q15. They have recently 
experienced life trauma 0.607* 0.971** 0.364 
Complex 
needs (2) 
4 3.081 14 Q18. They have a history of violent 
offence(s) 1.009*** -0.305 -1.314*** 
Q26. They are a current risk to 
others 1.098*** -0.016 -1.114** 
Q38. They endorse violence 1.692**** -0.396 -2.09**** 
Q14. They have been known to 
mental health historically  -1.863**** -0.586 1.276*** 
Q32. Use threats or violence to cope 0.930*** -0.125 -1.504** 
Q37. They experience issues with 
their identity  1.069*** 0.231 -0.838* 
Q8. Experiences of an Affective 
Disorder  -1.794**** -0.322 1.473*** 
Q25. Has been diagnosed with or 
experiences symptoms of 
neurodevelopmental disorder 
-1.701**** -0.255 1.446*** 
Q2. Live a chaotic lifestyle 1.305*** 0.17 -1.135** 
Q4. They have a history of anti-
social offence(s) 1.691**** 0.601 -1.089** 
Q16. Experiences dysregulated 
behaviour or problems in that area 
-0.647* 0.256 0.903* 
Q11. They experience racial tension 
within their local community  




3 2.365 11 Q36. They have a history of hate 
crime offence(s) -0.05 -1.452*** -1.402*** 
Q24. Experiences of trauma during 
their childhood -0.065 0.998** 1.063** 
Q13. Have poor coping styles  -0.105 1.596**** 1.701*** 
Distinguishes all factor groups Q1. Needs further assessment  -1.046*** 1.682**** 2.73**** 
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Factor n Eigen Value 
% 









 Factor 3 
Q9. They seek power 2.606**** 1.561**** -1.045** 
Q19. They associate with members 
of extremist groups -1.018*** -3.479**** -2.46**** 
Q22. Has been diagnosed with or 
experiences symptoms of cognitive 
impairment  -1.71**** -0.993** 0.725* 
Q29. Peer delinquency at school  1.698**** 0.838** -0.860* 
Q31. Being the victim of bullying 
during their early years 0.569* 1.982**** 1.413*** 
Q33. They have been known to no 
mental health team -2.104**** -1.111*** 0.994** 
Q34. They express/hold racist views -1.342**** -2.722**** -1.380*** 
Consensus for all factor groups  Q3. They are a current risk to 
themselves -0.167 -0.007 0.16 
Q7. They are vulnerable to 
exploitation  -0.466 -0.277 0.189 
Q12. Experienced acculturation  0.128 -0.428 -0.556 
Q30. Members of their family 
are/have been involved in crime 0.176 0.212 0.036 
Q35. Experiences of caregiver 
disruption during their early years -0.047 0.517 0.564 
Q39. Currently experiencing some 
form of abuse 0.043 0.314 0.272 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, ****p<.0001 
 
Power seekers: Participants in this factor believed that knowing about an 
individual’s attitudes about ‘being aggrieved’, ‘seek power’ and ‘have issues with 
identity’ was helpful. It was felt that if individuals felt aggrieved then the issues 
became more personal and led to a sense that they are a victim, which they want to 
rectify. Historical items of ‘early life trauma’ and ‘poor coping styles’ were also 
considered to be helpful.  
Complex needs: The participants in this factor believed that it is helpful to 
think about vulnerabilities with No Specific Ideology extremists, in particular if ‘they 
experience symptoms or diagnosis of neurodevelopmental disorder’ or ‘experience 
symptoms or diagnosis of cognitive disorder’ or ‘affective disorder’. They were 
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considered to be a ‘risk to themselves’ and ‘have poor coping styles’. They did not 
believe that the environmental factor of ‘racial tension within their community’ was 
helpful.   
Violent extremists: The participants in this factor believed violent items to be 
helpful, such as a ‘history of violent offences’ and ‘use threats or violence to cope’. It 
was believed that if an individual has a previous offence then they like offending in 
general, which can increase their risk of engaging in extremist behaviour. It was also 
helpful to know if they ‘express/hold racist views’ or ‘associate with members of 
extremist groups’.  










Q3. They are a current risk to themselves 1 2 1 1 
Q5. They have been subject to multiagency working 0 -1 -1 1 
Q6. There is known gang activity within the local community -3 -4 -4 1 
Q7. They are vulnerable to exploitation 0 1 0 1 
Q12. Experienced acculturation -2 -2 -1 1 
Q27. They seek to threaten others 1 0 0 1 
Q28. Make frequent requests for help from others to cope -1 -1 -2 1 
Q35. Experiences of caregiver disruption during their early 
years -1 -1 -2 1 
Q39. Currently experiencing some form of abuse 2 2 1 1 
Q30. Members of their family are/have been involved in 
crime -2 -3 -3 1 
Q11. They experience racial tensions within their local 
community -3 -1 -3 2 
Q16. Experiences dysregulated behaviour or problems in 
that area -1 1 -1 2 
Q17. They have recently lost their job or failed school 3 1 2 2 
Q23. They express/hold pro-criminal attitudes 0 -2 -2 2 
Q25. Has been diagnosed with or experiences symptoms of 
a neurodevelopmental disorder 1 3 1 2 
Q2. Live a chaotic lifestyle 0 -3 0 3 
Q4. They have a history of anti-social offence(s) 0 -3 -1 3 
Q15. They have recently experienced a life trauma 3 1 0 3 
Q18. They have a history of violent offence(s) 2 0 3 3 












Q26. They are a current risk to others 3 0 3 3 
Q29. Peer delinquency at school -1 -4 -2 3 
Q32. Use threats or violence to cope 1 -1 2 3 
Q36. They have a history of hate crime offence(s) -2 -2 1 3 
Q37. They experience issues with their identity 3 0 2 3 
Q8. Experiences of Affective Disorder 0 4 1 4 
Q10. They express/hold feelings of being aggrieved by 
others 4 0 1 4 
Q14. They have been known to mental health historically 0 4 2 4 
Q20. They have recently changed religion -4 0 0 4 
Q22. Has been diagnosed with or experiences symptoms of 
cognitive impairment -1 3 0 4 
Q1. Needs further assessment -1 1 -4 5 
Q13. Have poor coping styles 2 3 -2 5 
Q31. Being the victim of bullying during their early years 2 1 -3 5 
Q38. They endorse violence 1 -2 3 5 
Q19. They associate with members of extremist groups -2 0 4 6 
Q33. They have been known to no mental health team -3 3 0 6 
Q34. They express/hold racist views -3 -1 3 6 
Q9. They seek power 4 -3 -1 7 





 For Extreme-Right Wing the most helpful statements were ‘associate with 
extremist groups’ and ‘express/hold racist views’. This group considered ‘known 
gang activity’ to be one of the least helpful items. The consensus statement for 
Extreme-Right Wing was ‘they have recently changed religion’, which all three 
factors agreed was the least helpful statement. This was the statement that caused 
the most contention for Islamist ideology, with responses ranging from -3 to 3 in the 
placement on the Q-sort grid. The statement of consensus for Islamist was ‘exposed 
to extremist beliefs’, which was considered to be the most helpful statement. The 
least helpful statements were related to ‘known gang activity’ in the area and ‘making 
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frequent requests for help’. The highest range for the contention statement for 
Extreme-Right Wing was five points, for Islamist it was six points, whereas for No 
Specific Ideology it was an eight points range. This suggests that there is a bigger 
discrepancy in professional’s views about No Specific Ideology extremists. This is 
further evident as there was no one statement that was considered the most helpful 
for No Specific Ideology, as each factor group placed a different statement in box 
four on the grid. ‘Known gang activity’ was consistently considered unhelpful for all 
ideology groups.  ‘Associating with members of extremist groups’ was considered 
helpful for Extreme-Right Wing and Islamist ideology, however much less helpful for 















 The aim of this study was to explore how Prevent professionals understand 
factors related to engagement in extremist violence for Extreme-Right Wing, Islamist 
and No Specific Ideology extremists. Using the Q-sort method three factors were 
identified for each of these ideologies. All 22 participants loaded onto the Extreme-
Right Wing factors, however two participants for Islamist and one for No Specific 
Ideology were not represented by any of the three factors. This suggests that there 
is more of an agreement by the participants for the Extreme-Right Wing Q-sort.   
 Overall the results suggest a mixed view in that there are both similarities and 
differences in how professionals within Prevent understand and formulate different 
potential risk factors for engagement in extremist violence. 
One way the three ideology groups were viewed similarly, were with ‘known 
gang activity in the local community’ being rated as the least helpful statement. 
Participants stated that this was because it did not state that the individual 
themselves was part of the gang. However, ‘associating with members of extremist 
groups’ was rated the most helpful statement for both Extreme-Right Wing and 
Islamist ideology because this did specify they were part of something. This would 
suggest that the influence of an extremist group is powerful regardless of the 
ideological cause, which could be explained through the sense of belonging or 
identity that the individual gains from being part of the group or holding a shared 
view with their peers (Lloyd & Dean, 2015). An individual who has extremist thoughts 
whilst going about their daily life is said to be ‘less radicalised’ than those who seek 
out and join extremist groups (Kruglanski, Gelfand, Belange, Sheveland, 
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Hetiarachchi & Grunaratna, 2014). Applying theories of group process and gang 
culture to this statement can support Prevent professionals in understanding the 
relevance of it as a risk factor. Being a member of a gang is considered a primary 
criminogenic factor that can reduce an individual’s ability to desist from engaging in 
offending behaviour (Wood & Alleyne, 2010). Furthermore, being part of an extremist 
group can be a strong ‘pull’ factor into extremist violence (Horgan, 2008) and provide 
a range of ‘secondary gains.’ These can include affiliation, protection, status, social 
stability and material rewards (Tamatea, 205). In addition, identification as a member 
of a group can help to buffer against failures in life and provide a sense of 
significance and personal power (Kruglanski et al., 2014). Terrorist management 
theorists present a range of evidence that holding a collective identity within a group 
reduces an individual’s ‘fear of death’ (Greenberg, Pyszczynski Solomon, Simon & 
Breus,1994 & Arndt, Greenberg, Soloman, Pyszczynski & Simon, 1997) which is 
important to be aware of when considering the risk of terrorist acts. This evidence 
suggests that ‘associating with extremist groups’ should be a helpful risk factor for 
Prevent professionals to consider, which supports the results of this study. Not only 
does exploring it help to think about the individuals’ risk, but also the best way to 
intervene. This will be discussed further in the ‘Implications for Prevent 
Professionals’ section.  
There were further similarities between Islamist and Extreme-Right Wing 
ideology with ‘feelings of being aggrieved’ being considered as somewhat helpful 
and ‘experiences of caregiver disruption’ being considered to be less helpful. There 
were however, fewer similarities identified between these two ideology groups and 
the No Specific Ideology group. Also noted were that ‘feelings of being aggrieved’ 
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created a mixture of responses from four to zero. However, ‘caregiver disruption’ 
was considered a little more helpful within the No Specific Ideology group.  
Despite these similarities there were a number of differences present. This 
included the helpfulness of ‘recently changed religion’ as a statement. In this case 
the statement was rated the least helpful item for Extreme-Right Wing, however it 
was the statement that caused the greatest contention for Islamist ideology (ratings 
from -3 to 3). This suggests that this is an area in which Prevent professionals feel 
differently, in relation to how much it impacts on an individual with an Islamist 
ideologies risk. ‘History of hate crime offence(s)’ and ‘history of anti-social offence(s)’ 
were considered less helpful for Islamist ideology than for Extreme-Right Wing. This 
suggests that Prevent professionals believe that Extreme-Right Wing is linked to this 
type of offending, which supports research that Far-right terrorists are more likely to 
have previous convictions (Chermak & Gruenwald, 2015). Furthermore, 
‘express/hold racist views’ was considered to be more helpful for Extreme-Right 
Wing ideology. One statement that was considered to be more helpful for Islamist 
ideology than Extreme-Right Wing was ‘express/hold extremist views’.   
Within each ideology group there were differences of views between the 
participants, which were evident from the three factor groups. The No Specific 
Ideology group had the highest range of responses to the statements (range of 8) 
and there was no statement that all participants agreed on. This suggests that No 
Specific Ideology is the group with the highest level of contention, with professionals 
holding a range views of what is regarded as helpful.  
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Although the research highlights vulnerabilities that professionals may look for 
in risk assessments, it does not explain what leads to the transition between 
‘thinking’ and ‘action.’ The logistic regression completed for the design of the 
concourse identified 39 statistical factors that may offer an explanation. That said, 
hypotheses proposed are tentative due to the limitations in the reliability of the data. 
Models explaining this transition do exist in the field of sexual offending; for example, 
the ‘Four Predictions of Sexual Abuse’ (Finkelhor, 1984); ‘Model of Sexual 
Aggression/Addiction’ (Wolf, 1988) and the ‘Pathways Model of Sexual Offending’ 
(Ward & Siegert, 2002). However, such a model is not present for extremist violence. 
As previously highlighted the statement ‘associates with members of extremist 
groups’ was one that was considered to be helpful for all of the factors in both 
Extreme Right-Wing and Islamist ideology. This statement is one that suggests a 
shift in an individual’s motivation and intent. They have moved from ‘thinking’ about a 
topic to ‘doing’, in that they have sought out likeminded people to associate with. 
Further research needs to be completed around this area to support in developing a 
model to explain this transition. 
 Ideology used to be considered as the main driver for terrorist offences, e.g. 
the 9/11 attack, but this is now considered more of a proxy measure. This shift in the 
importance of ideology is further supported in the results of this study, which show 
that there are a number of similarities in how vulnerabilities are considered, 
irrespective of the ideology. This suggests that even when ideology is present, it is 
not the strongest predictor of risk. This impacts on how Prevent professionals may 
address risk assessments, recommending that they hold in mind the presenting 
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difficulties and formulate the presence and relevance of risk factors, rather than the 
individual’s potential ideology alone.  
In summary, the findings suggest that there are only a few statements that 
professionals are swayed by in terms of Extreme-Right Wing or Islamist Ideology. 
The remaining statements are similar across the two groups. There is a higher level 
of disagreement amongst Prevent professionals with No Specific Ideology, 
suggesting that professionals are more ideology driven. There were only a handful of 
statements that all participants within the factor groups agreed on. As statement 
cards were not placed in exactly the same place it highlights that there are 
differences in how Prevent staff perceive risk factors. The findings suggest the need 
for a formulation based approach to risk assessments, allowing professionals to 
understand how vulnerabilities are connected and are pertinent for each individual 
case. This will be explored further in the ‘Implications for Prevent Professionals’ 
section. Finally, the study concludes that in order to develop a model of transition-
into-action, more research needs to be completed within this field.  
 
Strengths and Weaknesses 
 
As highlighted in the methodology section of this paper the data from which 
the concourse was developed was not coded by the author. This lead to questions 
about the validity of the data and potentially reduced the sensitivity and specificity of 
the statistical analysis that was completed. As a result, the original methodology 
considered for the research needed to be adapted to a Q-sort to gain more 
qualitative data.  
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The sample of Prevent professionals was regionally biased, with only two 
professionals participating from London.  The remaining sample drew from the West 
Midlands and Staffordshire Counter Terrorism offices. There are three central mental 
health hubs for Counter Terrorism; Manchester, West Midlands and London. Using 
this sample may have led to a regional bias in the findings. To improve this view, it 
would be beneficial to include a wider sample from all hubs in future research.   
The study required participants to complete a Q-sort grid on a group of 
individuals for a specific ideology. This differs from their day-to-day job, in which they 
receive a referral for an individual and are asked to consider the vulnerability factors 
for that case alone. Completing a grid on a group basis reduces that level of 
individualisation. A number of participants expressed during the research that they 
were thinking of a specific case. Furthermore, they highlighted that the placing of the 
cards in the grid would vary case to case. For example, if the referral was an 
unaccompanied minor it would alter the importance of certain statements.  
 Despite the limitations identified this research is the first of its kind to draw 
upon NPCC data of real-life Prevent referrals. It explores the workings of people 
within Prevent, an area which has been minimally researched to date. The world of 
terrorism changes at a rapid rate and it is therefore difficult to have a substantive 
grounding of research to evidence the work that is being undertaken.  
 
Implications for Prevent Professionals 
 
 The professionals within his study ranged in years of experience and the 
number of cases managed. The least experienced professional had been in Prevent 
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for 15 months, managing 44 cases, with the most experienced having ten years of 
experience, managing around 700 cases. Despite this wealth of knowledge, the 
findings suggest that, except for ‘associating with extremist groups’ there were no 
other ‘key’ statements identified as helpful risk factors across the board. During the 
research, participants shared that they were drawing on specific cases that ‘stuck’ in 
their mind. They recognised that the order of Q-sort would vary if they were 
considering different cases.     
As in the evidence of the Historical Clinical Risk Managemnt-20 (HCR-20; Douglas, 
Hart, Webster, & Belfrage, 2013), this is another example of why formulation based 
risk assessment is so important, not only considering the presence of risk factors but 
crucially their relevance.  Evidence has suggested that the key to identifying which 
risk factors are pertinent to an individual is through the use of case formulation (Hart, 
Sturmey, Logan & McMurran, 2011).Utilising formulation would allow for an 
individualised approach, encouraging professionals to identify the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ 
factors relevant to each case (Horgan, 2008).  This is in line with the Offender 
Personality Disorder (OPD) Pathway Strategy, which is already used within forensic 
services. It aims to support the formulation and management of highly complex and 
high-risk cases (National Offender Management Service, 2015). Formulation has 
been found to be critical in managing cases which are complex and presenting with 
a potential risk to both themselves and others (Davidson, 2006). This research 
highlights that there are a number of factors that need to be considered for the 
assessment of Prevent referrals, leading to the management of possibly complex 
cases. Utilising a framework, such as the OPD Pathway, that has an established 
evidence base of working with such complexity, will support Prevent professionals in 
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understanding the individual. In turn it will help to generate a robust management 
plan to reduce the risk of an individual crossing the threshold to criminal behaviour.  
Another practical implication that arises from the study is to explore how the 
referral data is coded and stored. As highlighted in the limitations, there were gaps in 
the data used for the concourse. Ensuring that the data is more reliable in the future 
allows for stronger conclusions to be drawn from future research.  
Finally, the study encourages professionals to think about the function of 
certain risk factors and how they can intervene effectively, for example, ‘associating 
with extremist groups’. As highlighted previously, research suggests that there is a 
range of secondary gains for an individual in being part of a group such as status, 
friendships, material rewards (Kruglanski et al., 2014). If Prevent professionals wish 
to steer the individual away from their extremist group in attempts to reduce their 
vulnerability to being radicalised, they need to think about how they work with them 
to continue to ensure that they still have the things that they desire.  
 
Implications for Future Research  
 
As indicated further research needs to be considered and completed on the 
practices of Prevent professionals. It is an area that is funded by the Government 
and requires outcome measures to be completed to help inform and ensure best 
practice. Considering the limitation of the regional bias, it would be beneficial to 
complete research comparing the Q-sorts of the three main hubs. This would allow 
for comparison of the risk assessments that are being completed within each area.  
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 Due to the small number of clinicians in the sample, the study was unable to 
explore whether there were differences in how clinicians formulate compared to 
police officers. This would be a helpful area for future research, which could in turn 
inform future practice, possibly highlighting the importance for joint working. 
Furthermore, it would be beneficial to complete research to identify qualitative data 
of Prevent professional’s experiences of their work. Undertaking a semi-structured 
interview would allow thematic analysis to be conducted, identifying key themes and 
further inform best practice within this field.  
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PUBLIC DISSEMINATION DOCUMENT  
 
 Presented in this document is an overview of the thesis contributing to a 
Doctorate in Forensic Clinical Psychology for the University of Birmingham. This 
overview contains two summaries, 1). A systematic review exploring the functional 
link between criminality and terrorism and 2). A research paper exploring Prevent 
professionals understanding and formulation of potential risk factors for three 
different ideology groups.  
 
SUMMARY ONE: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW 
Introduction  
 
Research around vulnerabilities to extremism has explored psychological 
traits, including personality and mental illness. Early studies linked engagement in 
extremist violence to abnormal personalities (Cooper, 1978; Gill & Corner, 2017), in 
particular narcissistic traits (Pearlstein, 1991). It has also been suggested that low 
self-esteem, lack of empowerment or assertiveness can lead to an individual being 
susceptible to engagement in terrorism (Lawal, 20002; Orbach, 2001). However, 
other scholars have proposed an alternative view, that terrorists do not have 
abnormal personalities (Crenshaw, 2002; Reid 2002, Sagemen, 2004), arguing that 
there is no single type of personality for individuals who engage in extremist violence 
(Martin, 2011).   
In relation to mental health vulnerabilities the stance in the literature has 
changed over the years. Initially it was concluded that mental illness was a factor 
linked to extremist violence (Cooper, 1978; Pearce, 1977), although this could not be 
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evidenced as a causal link (Post 2005, 2007), so the view changed to suggest that 
mental illness was not a factor. More recent research has highlighted mental illness 
to be present in lone actor samples (Corner, Gill & Mason, 2015; Gill & Corner, 
2017), suggesting that it may be more of a risk factor for individuals who commit 
terrorist offences alone.   
An area explored less frequently in academic literature is the vulnerability of 
previous criminal behaviour. Journalistic articles have highlighted the presence of 
criminal histories in the perpetrators of recent terrorist attacks such as the Brussels 
Airport attack and the Paris attack. Journalists have proposed the idea of a ‘new 
breed’ of terrorists, who use their criminal skills to achieve the objectives of a 
terrorist group (Faiola & Mekhennet, 2016).  
The aim of this review was to explore if there is an association between 
criminality and terrorism in the literature and provide explanations of the function of 




 Literature searches found 12 studies which explored the presence of 
criminality in a sample of different terrorists (e.g. Jihadist or Far-Right). It looked at 
samples of both group actors and lone actor terrorists. The quality of the studies was 
examined and the main findings summarised in the review. Eleven of the studies 
used open source case file reviews as a methodology. One study completed a 






 The review showed that there is an association in the literature of criminality 
and terrorism. All of the studies explored criminality and found a level of prevalence 
to some degree in their samples, with up to 60% having a criminal history. Little 
evidence was provided to describe the possible functional link between criminality 
and terrorism, with hypotheses including; to fundraise money for their terrorist 
activity or as a means to ‘right the wrong’ of their criminal past (Basra, Neumann & 
Bruner, 2016).  
 Although all of the papers received a low score for their level of bias the 
methodological quality of the studies was rated as weak due to the limitations of 
using open source file data. This reduces the strength of the conclusions that can be 
drawn from the review.   
 




 There have been three main movements in risk assessments, where initially 
clinicians were required to rely solely on their professional judgement to assess an 
individual’s level of risk (Singh Grann & Frazel, 2011). The second movement led to 
the development of actuarial risk assessments, where clinicians code specific and 
relevant factors based on empirical evidence (Monahan, Steadman, Silver, 
Applebaum, Robbins, Mulvey, Roth, Grisso & Banks, 2001). The third movement, 
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structured professional judgement, relies on a combination of actuarial measures 
and professional judgement.  
 Risk assessments are used to assess a range of different offending 
behaviour, such as; domestic violence (Kropp, Hart, Webster & Eaves, 1995, 1999) 
or youth violence (Borum, Bartel & Forth, 2002). However, the evidence base for 
assessments used with extremist violence is limited.  
 To address extremist violence and terrorist acts the United Kingdom 
Government introduced the Contest Strategy in 2003, which was revised in 2011 
(Home Office, 2011). This looks at four key areas: Pursue, Prevent, Protect and 
Prepare (HM Government, 2011). This paper focused on the Prevent aspect, 
stopping individuals from joining or supporting terrorist groups. It explored how 
professionals within Prevent make sense of a range of risk factors for three different 





 22 Prevent professionals completed a Q-sort for three different ideology 
groups. Q-sort methodology explores the views and opinions of individuals relating 
to a specific topic (Reid, Swift & Mehanna, 2017; Watts & Stenner, 2005). 39 
statement cards were identified through the analysis of data regarding Prevent 
referrals. The participants were required to place the statement cards into a grid, 
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depending on how helpful they considered each statement to be. The placement of 




 Overall there was a mixture of results identified from the study. There were 
more similarities in how professionals viewed Extreme-Right Wing and Islamist 
ideology than the individuals with No Specific Ideology. Furthermore, there were only 
a few statements that all participants agreed on in terms of their helpfulness. 
‘Associating with members of extremist groups’ was considered the most helpful 
factor. The greatest level of disagreement was for the No Specific Ideology group, 
highlighting that Prevent professionals are more ideologically driven. The findings 
suggest that there is some difference in how professionals view risk factors and 
using a formulation based approach, that allows for individual characteristics to be 
considered, would be beneficial for future practice.  
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Appendix A: Methodological Quality Checklist (Downs & Black 1997) 
Quality criteria Scoring guidelines 
 Yes No Unable to 
determine 
Reporting Bias    
Clear description of hypothesis / aims    
Main outcomes to be measured reported    
Characteristics of sample clearly reported    
Findings clearly reported    
Selection Bias    
Is the identification of relevant cases clearly described?     
Were the cases representative of the target population?    
Is a comparison group used?    
Performance Bias    
Were there procedures to identify and correct for response 
biases in the reported cases 
   
Is there cross validation and triangulation of data sources?    
Detection Bias    
Was the method of outcome identification explained?    
Were outcomes hypotheses driven?    
Internal Validity  Bias    
No unplanned statistical analysis    
Appropriateness of statistical analysis    
Outcome measures accurate (reliable and valid)    
Statistical Bias    
The analytical method was appropriate for the research 
question 
   
The qualitative descriptions of findings are rich and meaningful    
Were the conclusions logically and proportionately derived 
from the analytical method? 
   
Power    
Sufficient power to detect clinically significant effect    
Generalisabilty     
Do the findings include enough “thick descriptions” for readers 
to assess the potential transferability appropriateness for their 
own settings? 
   
Are the findings congruent with, connected to, or confirmatory 
of prior theory? 
   







Appendix B: Scoring code  
Quality score Methodological Quality  Risk of bias  
14 to 20 Strong methodological quality  Low risk of bias 
7 to 13 Intermediate methodological quality Moderate risk of bias 






















Appendix C: NICE (2005) Guidance for Assigning Level of Evidence Ratings 
Type of evidence Level  
High-quality meta-analyses, systematic reviews of RCTs, or 




Well-conducted meta-analyses, systematic reviews of RCTs, 
or RCTs with a low 
risk of bias 
 
1+ 
Meta-analyses, systematic reviews of RCTs, or RCTs with a 




High-quality systematic reviews of case–control or cohort 
studies. High-quality case–control or cohort studies with a 
very low risk of confounding, bias or chance and a high 
probability that the relationship is causal 
 
2++ 
Well-conducted case–control or cohort studies with a low risk 
of confounding, bias or chance and a moderate probability 
that the relationship is causal 
 
2+ 
Case–control or cohort studies with a moderate/high risk of 
confounding bias, or chance and a significant risk that the 
relationship is not causal* 
 
2- 
Non-analytic studies (for example, case reports, case series)* 3- 









Appendix D: University of Birmingham Ethics Form 
 
Dear Dr Jones 
Re:  “How do professionals within mental health services formulate when assessing 
individuals who are considered to be vulnerable to engaging in extremist 
behaviours?” 
Application for Ethical Review ERN_16-0011 
 
Thank you for your application for ethical review for the above project, which has now been 
reviewed by the Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics Ethical Review 
Committee. 
On behalf of the Committee, I am pleased to confirm a favourable ethical opinion for your 
project, subject to your adherence to the following conditions: 
 Please be aware of the data storage and retention requirements in the University’s 
Code of Practice for Research (available at 
http://www.as.bham.ac.uk/legislation/docs/COP_Research.pdf).  In particular, please 
note that following completion of the research, data should normally be preserved 
and accessible for ten years.  
For clarification, as long as the conditions above are met and the details of the proposed 
work do not change, your project has ethics approval and no further action is necessary. 
I would like to remind you that any substantive changes to the nature of the study as 
described in the Application for Ethical Review, and/or any adverse events occurring during 
the study should be promptly bought to the Committee’s attention by the Principal 
Investigator and may necessitate further ethical review.   
Please also ensure that the relevant requirements within the University’s Code of Practice 
for Research and the information and guidance provided on the University’s ethics 
webpages (available at https://intranet.birmingham.ac.uk/finance/accounting/Research-
Support-Group/Research-Ethics/Links-and-Resources.aspx ) are adhered to and referred to 
in any future applications for ethical review.  It is now a requirement on the revised 
application form (https://intranet.birmingham.ac.uk/finance/accounting/Research-Support-
Group/Research-Ethics/Ethical-Review-Forms.aspx ) to confirm that this guidance has been 
consulted and is understood, and that it has been taken into account when completing your 




Deputy Research Ethics Officer 





Appendix E: Amended ethics form  
 
Dear Dr Jones & Dr Fowler 
Re:  “How do professionals within mental health services formulate when assessing 
individuals who are considered to be vulnerable to engaging in extremist 
behaviours?” 
Application for amendment ERN_16-0011A 
Thank you for the above application for amendment, which was reviewed by the Science, 
Technology, Engineering and Mathematics Ethical Review Committee.   
On behalf of the Committee, I can confirm that this amendment now has full ethical approval. 
I would like to remind you that any substantive changes to the nature of the study as now 
amended, and/or any adverse events occurring during the study should be promptly bought 
to the Committee’s attention by the Principal Investigator and may necessitate further ethical 
review.  A revised amendment application form is now available at 
https://intranet.birmingham.ac.uk/finance/accounting/Research-Support-Group/Research-
Ethics/Ethical-Review-Forms.aspx .  Please ensure this form is submitted for any further 
amendments.  
Please also ensure that the relevant requirements within the University’s Code of Practice 
for Research and the information and guidance provided on the University’s ethics 
webpages (available at https://intranet.birmingham.ac.uk/finance/accounting/Research-
Support-Group/Research-Ethics/Links-and-Resources.aspx ) are adhered to and referred to 
in any future applications for ethical review.  It is now a requirement on the revised 
application form (https://intranet.birmingham.ac.uk/finance/accounting/Research-Support-
Group/Research-Ethics/Ethical-Review-Forms.aspx ) to confirm that this guidance has been 
consulted and is understood, and that it has been taken into account when completing your 
application for ethical review. 
Please be aware that whilst Health and Safety (H&S) issues may be considered during the 
ethical review process, you are still required to follow the University’s guidance on H&S and 
to ensure that H&S risk assessments have been carried out as appropriate.  For further 
information about this, please contact your School H&S representative or the University’s 
H&S Unit at healthandsafety@contacts.bham.ac.uk.    
  
If you require a hard copy of this correspondence, please let me know.  
Kind regards, 
Miss Sam Waldron  
Deputy Research Ethics Officer 
Research Support Group 
C Block Dome (room 132) Aston Webb Building 




Appendix F: Q-set 
 
Experiences of trauma 
during their childhood                                                      
(e.g. abuse or neglect) 
Peer delinquency at school                           
(Would get into trouble with their peers 
at school, e.g. school fights) 
Experiences of caregiver 
disruption during their 
early years                                                             
(e.g. time in care, moved around to the 
care of different family members) 
Being the victim of bullying 
during their early years                
(e.g. at school or in the community) 
Experienced acculturation 
(Cultural change and psychological 
change following them meeting 
between cultures) 
They have recently 
changed religion                                       
(Either changed religion or have become 
more religious) 
They seek power                            
(Seeks a position of power and influence 
over others, seeks recognition, praise 
and admiration) 
They seek to threaten 
others                                    
(Threatens others, intimidate or identify 
with threatening others) 
They experience issue with 
their identity                                           
(An unstable sense of self, not knowing 
where one fits, frequent changes of 
religion and/or image) 
They have been exposed 
to extremist beliefs                        
(Within the home or the community. 
E.g. Mosque or gym) 
119 
 
Members of their family 
are/have been involved in 
crime                                         
(Family members involved in any crime, 
have a criminal history or conviction) 
Currently experiencing 
some form of abuse                                     
(e.g. trauma or bullying) 
They have recently lost 
their job or failed school               
(e.g. have been fired or expelled) 
They have recently 
experienced a life trauma                                           
(e.g. moved house/school/work, 
marriage breakdown, retirement, debt) 
They have been subject to 
multiagency working  
(Involvement from 2 or more services 
e.g. police, mental health, social 
services) 
They have been known to 
no mental health team                
(Either historically or currently) 
They have been known to 
mental health historically         
(Have been known in the past but not 
currently known to a team) 
They have a history of hate 
crime offence(s)                                         
(e.g. violent or non-violent crime driven 
by racism or prejudice)  
They have  history of anti-
social offence(s)                                  
(e.g. delinquency, ASBO's, breach f the 
peace, drunk and disorderly) 
They have a history of 
violent offence(s)                             
(actual violence or threatening 
behaviours, weapons or firearms) 
120 
 
They are vulnerable to 
exploitation                                          
(e.g. Low self-esteem, subject to 
safeguarding) 
They express/hold racist 
views                                                                   
(e.g. views such as them and us) 
They endorse violence     
(Endorses violence towards specific 
groups in order to achieve a goal) 
They express/hold feelings 
of being aggrieved by 
others         
(A sense of being wrongly or unfairly 
treated or deprived, feeling victimised or 
targeted) 
They express/hold pro-
criminal attitudes               
(Negative attitudes towards authority, 
permissive attitudes) 
They are a current risk to 
themselves                                 
(This does not include self-harm but 
looking at placing themselves at risk of 
things such as exploitation or abuse) 
They are a current risk to 
others                                         
(Risk to known others or the general 
public - has intent or capability to cause 
harm to others) 
They experience racial 
tensions within their local 
community                                                         
(hey are aware of it but not part of it) 
There is known gang 
activity within the local 
community   (They are aware of it 
but not part of it)  
They associate with 




Use threats or violence to 
cope                                        
(Violence is a means to cope with stress 
or problems) 
Have poor coping styles           
(Have limited coping skills to manage 
problems or stress) 
Live a chaotic lifestyle             
(No structure or routine) 
Makes frequent requests 
for help from others to 
cope         
 (To cope with stress and problems) 
Has been diagnosed with 
or experiences symptoms 
of a neurodevelopmental 
disorder                                       
(e.g. ADHD or Autism) 
Has been diagnosed with 
or experiences symptoms 
of cognitive impairment                     
(e.g. traumatic brain injury, learning 
disability or dementia) 
Experiences dysregulated 
behaviour or problems in 
that area                                                
(Behaviour that s unmanageable or 
disinhibited, intense emotions, e.g. self-
harm, sexually disinhibited behaviour) 
Experiences an Affective 
disorder                                                       
(e.g. Depression, Anxiety or another 
form of Mood disorder) 
Needs further assessment                                                     








Appendix G: Consent form     
 
Participant Identification Number:...............  
CONSENT FORM (Version 2.0, Date: August 2017)    
Title: How do professionals view factors related to engagement in extremist activity for 
different ideology groups? 
Researcher:  Hannah Green      Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have understood the information sheet dated June 2017 
(Version 2.0) for the above study.  I have had the opportunity to consider the 
information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time during the research interview, without giving any reason. 
 
 
3. I understand that the research Q-Study card sort will be audio-recorded  
 
4. I understand that following the research I will have a two-week period for 
reflection.  The researcher will then contact me at which point I may withdraw 
my data entirely or in part, without giving any reason. 
 
5. I understand that the data collected during this study will be looked at by the 
researcher and relevant others at the University of Birmingham to ensure that 
the analysis is a fair and reasonable representation of the data.   
 
6. I understand that direct quotes from my participation may be published in any 
write-up of the data, and used for training purposes, but that my name will not 
be attributed to any such quotes and that I will not be identifiable by my 
comments. 
 
7. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
................................  ...................  ...................................... 
Name of participant  Date   Signature 
...............................  ...................  ...................................... 














 This research is to explore your views on different factors in relation to 
different ideology groups. When we begin you will be asked a question. There 
is no right or wrong answers to the question. You will be asked to sort through 
some cards and place them in the grid in front of you, ranging from very 
unhelpful to very helpful. Whilst doing this I would like you to verbalise your 
thought process.  
 Any questions? 
 I would like you to complete this holding in mind the research question: Is this 
factor helpful to consider when thinking about Extreme-Right Wing ideology 
driven individuals who may go on to engage in extremist behaviour? 
 To begin with sort the cards into three categories; helpful, unhelp and unsure. 
 I will then ask you to place the cards in the grid.  














Appendix I: Q-sort grid 
 
Not very 
helpful        
Very 
helpful 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
                  
                  
                
                
            
            
          









Appendix J: Q-sort recording sheet  
Extreme-Right Wing       
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
                  
                  
                
                
              
              
          
         
Islamist         
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
                  
                  
                
                
              
              
          
         
No Specific         
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
                  
                  
                
                
              
              
          


















 This research is to explore your views on different factors in relation to 
different ideology groups. When we begin you will be asked a question. There 
is no right or wrong answers to the question. You will be asked to sort through 
some cards and place them in the grid in front of you, ranging from very 
unhelpful to very helpful. Whilst doing this I would like you to verbalise your 
thought process.  
 Any questions? 
 I would like you to complete this holding in mind the research question: Is this 
factor helpful to consider when thinking about Islamist ideology driven 
individuals who may go on to engage in extremist behaviour? 
 To begin with sort the cards into three categories; helpful, unhelp and unsure. 
 I will then ask you to place the cards in the grid.  














Appendix L: Instructions for No Specific Ideology Q-sort 
Instructions  
 
 This research is to explore your views on different factors in relation to 
different ideology groups. When we begin you will be asked a question. There 
is no right or wrong answers to the question. You will be asked to sort through 
some cards and place them in the grid in front of you, ranging from very 
unhelpful to very helpful. Whilst doing this I would like you to verbalise your 
thought process.  
 Any questions? 
 I would like you to complete this holding in mind the research question: Is this 
factor helpful to consider when thinking about individuals not driven by an 
ideology (No Specific Ideology group) who may go on to engage in extremist 
behaviour? 
 To begin with sort the cards into three categories; helpful, unhelp and unsure. 
 I will then ask you to place the cards in the grid.  
 You can ask for clarification at any point during the exercise.  
 
 
 
 
